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C&P: Could the UN have averted war?
HAIRY
Member Posts: 23,606
Could the UN have averted war?
David Ignatius
The Daily Star, Beirut
09-Feb-04
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/opinion/09_02_04_b.asp
The intelligence failure in Iraq began with United Nations weapons inspectors, who gathered detailed evidence that Saddam Hussein had destroyed his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 1991, but never presented those findings forcefully to the world, according to Iraq's top nuclear scientist.
Jafar Dhia Jafar, who ran Iraq's nuclear program from 1982 on, revealed new details of his country's dealings with UN inspectors in a telephone interview last Thursday from the United Arab Emirates, where he now lives. His interview was the first on-the-record discussion of Iraqi WMDs issues by the country's leading scientist since the end of the war.
Jafar said he has explained the 1991 termination of Iraqi WMD programs in over 20 voluntary debriefings with US officials since he left Iraq on April 7, 2003. The debriefings took place in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Amman. To confirm the accuracy of his account, he said, he volunteered to take a lengthy polygraph test, which US officials administered.
The comments from Iraq's most prominent scientist add a new perspective to the intense debate over Iraq's alleged WMD programs. Jafar, 61, who received his doctorate in physics in Britain in 1965, said his chief complaint was with the UN inspectors who, he said, "had all the facts, but evidently did not present them convincingly enough to the United Nations Security Council."
"The United Nations inspectors were on the ground. They were everywhere. They had access to all the documents," Jafar argued. "They knew the facts, and they should have said confidently that Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction."
Instead, he said, UN inspectors - under apparent pressure from the United States and Britain to continue looking for weapons that had actually been destroyed - kept asking for more time to conduct further searches. The Iraqis were never able to prove the negative.
If Jafar is right, the United Nations inspectors had detailed evidence to rebut the arguments about Iraqi WMDs made in the intelligence dossiers compiled by Britain and the United States. It is these dossiers that were a main justification for the March 2003 invasion. In the supercharged political atmosphere before the war, that evidence was either diluted, suppressed or ignored.
The UN's problems began with Saddam Hussein, by Jafar's own account. He said the Iraqi leader initially concealed some of his WMD stockpiles after the 1991 Gulf war by turning them over to his most trusted military unit, the Special Republican Guards (SRG). But after UN inspectors discovered some of the materials at an SRG camp in early July 1991, Saddam Hussein ordered the unilateral destruction of all his banned stockpiles. "Before the end of 1991, all proscribed nuclear, chemical, biological and missile assets were destroyed," Jafar said.
Jafar said Iraqis destroyed all stockpiles of chemical weapons, including mustard gas, sarin, tabun and VX and biological weapons, including botulinum toxin, anthrax and aflatoxin. Some of the biological toxins had been weaponized in 1990, but never used, so the regime decided to conceal them from UN inspectors, Jafar said. They also withheld some details of their nuclear program.
The Iraqi regime initially decided to deceive UN inspectors about some aspects of the nuclear and biological programs for two reasons, Jafar said: First, to obscure the extent to which they had violated treaties against developing such weapons; and second, to minimize the destruction of the facilities where they had carried out the work.
The first hints of the Iraqi bio-weapons program were made to UN chief inspector Rolf Ekeus in 1995, because the Iraqis knew that defectors had spoken of the program, Jafar said. A full accounting of the bio-weapons that had been destroyed four years before came after the 1995 defection to Jordan of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel Hassan. Remaining aspects of the nuclear program were also disclosed to UN inspectors that year, Jafar said.
But US and United Nations officials suspected that the Iraqis were probably hiding other violations. The mistrust was amplified by Saddam Hussein's antagonism toward the UN inspectors, whom he regarded as spies who might threaten his personal security, Jafar said.
As an example of the detailed information given to UN inspectors, Jafar cited 26 letters he provided between January 2003 and March 2003 to rebut allegations that Iraqis were continuing their nuclear weapons program. The letters, totaling 85 pages with 1,400 more as attachments, countered specific claims made in a Sept. 24, 2002, British intelligence dossier.
Jafar's story reinforces one theme of the unfolding Iraqi WMD saga: Even for intelligence analysts and UN experts, facts could not be disentangled from expectations. The will to believe that Saddam Hussein had WMDs was far stronger than the evidence that he didn't.
David Ignatius, a Paris-based syndicated columnist, is published regularly by THE DAILY STAR
Don't assume malice for what stupidity can explain.
David Ignatius
The Daily Star, Beirut
09-Feb-04
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/opinion/09_02_04_b.asp
The intelligence failure in Iraq began with United Nations weapons inspectors, who gathered detailed evidence that Saddam Hussein had destroyed his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 1991, but never presented those findings forcefully to the world, according to Iraq's top nuclear scientist.
Jafar Dhia Jafar, who ran Iraq's nuclear program from 1982 on, revealed new details of his country's dealings with UN inspectors in a telephone interview last Thursday from the United Arab Emirates, where he now lives. His interview was the first on-the-record discussion of Iraqi WMDs issues by the country's leading scientist since the end of the war.
Jafar said he has explained the 1991 termination of Iraqi WMD programs in over 20 voluntary debriefings with US officials since he left Iraq on April 7, 2003. The debriefings took place in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Amman. To confirm the accuracy of his account, he said, he volunteered to take a lengthy polygraph test, which US officials administered.
The comments from Iraq's most prominent scientist add a new perspective to the intense debate over Iraq's alleged WMD programs. Jafar, 61, who received his doctorate in physics in Britain in 1965, said his chief complaint was with the UN inspectors who, he said, "had all the facts, but evidently did not present them convincingly enough to the United Nations Security Council."
"The United Nations inspectors were on the ground. They were everywhere. They had access to all the documents," Jafar argued. "They knew the facts, and they should have said confidently that Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction."
Instead, he said, UN inspectors - under apparent pressure from the United States and Britain to continue looking for weapons that had actually been destroyed - kept asking for more time to conduct further searches. The Iraqis were never able to prove the negative.
If Jafar is right, the United Nations inspectors had detailed evidence to rebut the arguments about Iraqi WMDs made in the intelligence dossiers compiled by Britain and the United States. It is these dossiers that were a main justification for the March 2003 invasion. In the supercharged political atmosphere before the war, that evidence was either diluted, suppressed or ignored.
The UN's problems began with Saddam Hussein, by Jafar's own account. He said the Iraqi leader initially concealed some of his WMD stockpiles after the 1991 Gulf war by turning them over to his most trusted military unit, the Special Republican Guards (SRG). But after UN inspectors discovered some of the materials at an SRG camp in early July 1991, Saddam Hussein ordered the unilateral destruction of all his banned stockpiles. "Before the end of 1991, all proscribed nuclear, chemical, biological and missile assets were destroyed," Jafar said.
Jafar said Iraqis destroyed all stockpiles of chemical weapons, including mustard gas, sarin, tabun and VX and biological weapons, including botulinum toxin, anthrax and aflatoxin. Some of the biological toxins had been weaponized in 1990, but never used, so the regime decided to conceal them from UN inspectors, Jafar said. They also withheld some details of their nuclear program.
The Iraqi regime initially decided to deceive UN inspectors about some aspects of the nuclear and biological programs for two reasons, Jafar said: First, to obscure the extent to which they had violated treaties against developing such weapons; and second, to minimize the destruction of the facilities where they had carried out the work.
The first hints of the Iraqi bio-weapons program were made to UN chief inspector Rolf Ekeus in 1995, because the Iraqis knew that defectors had spoken of the program, Jafar said. A full accounting of the bio-weapons that had been destroyed four years before came after the 1995 defection to Jordan of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel Hassan. Remaining aspects of the nuclear program were also disclosed to UN inspectors that year, Jafar said.
But US and United Nations officials suspected that the Iraqis were probably hiding other violations. The mistrust was amplified by Saddam Hussein's antagonism toward the UN inspectors, whom he regarded as spies who might threaten his personal security, Jafar said.
As an example of the detailed information given to UN inspectors, Jafar cited 26 letters he provided between January 2003 and March 2003 to rebut allegations that Iraqis were continuing their nuclear weapons program. The letters, totaling 85 pages with 1,400 more as attachments, countered specific claims made in a Sept. 24, 2002, British intelligence dossier.
Jafar's story reinforces one theme of the unfolding Iraqi WMD saga: Even for intelligence analysts and UN experts, facts could not be disentangled from expectations. The will to believe that Saddam Hussein had WMDs was far stronger than the evidence that he didn't.
David Ignatius, a Paris-based syndicated columnist, is published regularly by THE DAILY STAR
Don't assume malice for what stupidity can explain.