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Intell chief's bombshell: 'We were overruled (C&P)
HAIRY
Member Posts: 23,606
Intelligence chief's bombshell: 'We were overruled on dossier'
By Paul Waugh, Deputy Political Editor
04 February 2004
The intelligence official whose revelations stunned the Hutton
inquiry has suggested that not a single defence intelligence expert
backed Tony Blair's most contentious claims on Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction.
As Mr Blair set up an inquiry yesterday into intelligence failures
before the war, Brian Jones, the former leading expert on WMD in the
Ministry of Defence, declared that Downing Street's dossier, a key
plank in convincing the public of the case for war, was "misleading"
on Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological capability. Writing in
today's Independent, Dr Jones, who was head of the nuclear, chemical
and biological branch of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) until
he retired last year, reveals that the experts failed in their
efforts to have their views reflected.
Dr Jones, who is expected to be a key witness at the new inquiry,
says: "In my view, the expert intelligence analysts of the DIS were
overruled in the preparation of the dossier in September 2002,
resulting in a presentation that was misleading about Iraq's
capabilities."
He calls on the Prime Minister to publish the intelligence behind the
Government's claims that Iraq was actively producing chemical weapons
and could launch an attack within 45 minutes of an order to do so. He
is "extremely doubtful" that anyone with chemical and biological
weapons expertise had seen the raw intelligence reports and that they
would prove just how right he and his colleagues were to be concerned
about the claims.
Downing Street was triumphant last week when Lord Hutton ruled that
Andrew Gilligan's claims that the dossier was "sexed up" were
unfounded, but Dr Jones's comments are bound to boost the case of the
BBC and others that the dossier failed to take into account the
worries of intelligence officials. Colin Powell, the US Secretary of
State, said yesterday that he might not have supported military
action against Baghdad if he had known that Iraq lacked weapons of
mass destruction.
Acutely aware of the American inquiry into the war, Mr Blair said
that a committee of inquiry would investigate "intelligence-
gathering, evaluation and use" in the UK before the conflict in Iraq.
Lord Butler of Brockwell, the former cabinet secretary, will chair
the five-strong committee, which will meet in private. The Liberal
Democrats refused to support the inquiry because they said that its
remit was not wide enough.
Dr Jones was the man whose decision to give evidence electrified the
Hutton inquiry as he disclosed that he had formally complained about
the dossier. The Government attempted to dismiss his complaints as
part of the normal process of "debate" within the DIS and claimed
that other sections of the intelligence community were better
qualified to assess the 45-minute and chemical production claims.
But today Dr Jones makes clear that he was not alone and declares
that the whole of the Defence Intelligence Staff, Britain's best
qualified analysts on WMD, agreed that the claims should have
been "carefully caveated". Furthermore, the Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC), which allowed the contentious claims to go into the
dossier, lacked the expertise to make a competent judgement on them.
Dr Jones makes clear that it was John Scarlett, the chairman of the
JIC, who was responsible for including the controversial claims in
the executive summary of the dossier that was used to justify war. It
was Mr Scarlett's strong assessment that allowed Alastair Campbell
to "translate a probability into a certainty" in Mr Blair's foreword
to the document, Dr Jones adds.
He says he foresaw at the time of the Government's dossier in
September 2002 that no major WMD stockpiles would be found. He made a
formal complaint about the dossier to avoid himself and his fellow
experts being cast as "scapegoats" for any such failure.
In his article, Dr Jones warns that intelligence analysts should not
be blamed for the lack of any significant finds in Iraq and points
out that it was the "intelligence community leadership" - the heads of
MI6 and MI5 and Mr Scarlett - who were responsible for the dossier. It
would be a "travesty" if the DIS was criticised over the affair, he
says.
Dr Jones complains that he and others were not allowed to see vital
intelligence supporting the 45-minute and chemical production claims.
He reveals, however, that he has discovered from a colleague that the
reports from the ground did not meet his and others' concerns about
the wording of the JIC's assessments. Also, he says, the Deputy Chief
of Defence Intelligence, Tony Cragg, did not see the supposedly
clinching intelligence and took on trust assurances from MI6 that it
was credible.
The Government yesterday finally slipped out its response to the
Intelligence and Security Committee's report last autumn on the
intelligence case in the approach to war.
For the first time ministers conceded that they "understand the
reasoning" for the committee's criticism that the presentation of the
45-minute claim in the dossier "allowed speculation as to its exact
meaning", including the firing of WMD on long-range missiles. But the
Government said it had not linked the claim to ballistic missiles.
It also rejected the MPs' call for complaints such as that of Dr
Jones to be sent direct to the JIC chairman. "It is important to
preserve the line management authority of JIC members," it said.
Don't assume malice for what stupidity can explain.
By Paul Waugh, Deputy Political Editor
04 February 2004
The intelligence official whose revelations stunned the Hutton
inquiry has suggested that not a single defence intelligence expert
backed Tony Blair's most contentious claims on Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction.
As Mr Blair set up an inquiry yesterday into intelligence failures
before the war, Brian Jones, the former leading expert on WMD in the
Ministry of Defence, declared that Downing Street's dossier, a key
plank in convincing the public of the case for war, was "misleading"
on Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological capability. Writing in
today's Independent, Dr Jones, who was head of the nuclear, chemical
and biological branch of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) until
he retired last year, reveals that the experts failed in their
efforts to have their views reflected.
Dr Jones, who is expected to be a key witness at the new inquiry,
says: "In my view, the expert intelligence analysts of the DIS were
overruled in the preparation of the dossier in September 2002,
resulting in a presentation that was misleading about Iraq's
capabilities."
He calls on the Prime Minister to publish the intelligence behind the
Government's claims that Iraq was actively producing chemical weapons
and could launch an attack within 45 minutes of an order to do so. He
is "extremely doubtful" that anyone with chemical and biological
weapons expertise had seen the raw intelligence reports and that they
would prove just how right he and his colleagues were to be concerned
about the claims.
Downing Street was triumphant last week when Lord Hutton ruled that
Andrew Gilligan's claims that the dossier was "sexed up" were
unfounded, but Dr Jones's comments are bound to boost the case of the
BBC and others that the dossier failed to take into account the
worries of intelligence officials. Colin Powell, the US Secretary of
State, said yesterday that he might not have supported military
action against Baghdad if he had known that Iraq lacked weapons of
mass destruction.
Acutely aware of the American inquiry into the war, Mr Blair said
that a committee of inquiry would investigate "intelligence-
gathering, evaluation and use" in the UK before the conflict in Iraq.
Lord Butler of Brockwell, the former cabinet secretary, will chair
the five-strong committee, which will meet in private. The Liberal
Democrats refused to support the inquiry because they said that its
remit was not wide enough.
Dr Jones was the man whose decision to give evidence electrified the
Hutton inquiry as he disclosed that he had formally complained about
the dossier. The Government attempted to dismiss his complaints as
part of the normal process of "debate" within the DIS and claimed
that other sections of the intelligence community were better
qualified to assess the 45-minute and chemical production claims.
But today Dr Jones makes clear that he was not alone and declares
that the whole of the Defence Intelligence Staff, Britain's best
qualified analysts on WMD, agreed that the claims should have
been "carefully caveated". Furthermore, the Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC), which allowed the contentious claims to go into the
dossier, lacked the expertise to make a competent judgement on them.
Dr Jones makes clear that it was John Scarlett, the chairman of the
JIC, who was responsible for including the controversial claims in
the executive summary of the dossier that was used to justify war. It
was Mr Scarlett's strong assessment that allowed Alastair Campbell
to "translate a probability into a certainty" in Mr Blair's foreword
to the document, Dr Jones adds.
He says he foresaw at the time of the Government's dossier in
September 2002 that no major WMD stockpiles would be found. He made a
formal complaint about the dossier to avoid himself and his fellow
experts being cast as "scapegoats" for any such failure.
In his article, Dr Jones warns that intelligence analysts should not
be blamed for the lack of any significant finds in Iraq and points
out that it was the "intelligence community leadership" - the heads of
MI6 and MI5 and Mr Scarlett - who were responsible for the dossier. It
would be a "travesty" if the DIS was criticised over the affair, he
says.
Dr Jones complains that he and others were not allowed to see vital
intelligence supporting the 45-minute and chemical production claims.
He reveals, however, that he has discovered from a colleague that the
reports from the ground did not meet his and others' concerns about
the wording of the JIC's assessments. Also, he says, the Deputy Chief
of Defence Intelligence, Tony Cragg, did not see the supposedly
clinching intelligence and took on trust assurances from MI6 that it
was credible.
The Government yesterday finally slipped out its response to the
Intelligence and Security Committee's report last autumn on the
intelligence case in the approach to war.
For the first time ministers conceded that they "understand the
reasoning" for the committee's criticism that the presentation of the
45-minute claim in the dossier "allowed speculation as to its exact
meaning", including the firing of WMD on long-range missiles. But the
Government said it had not linked the claim to ballistic missiles.
It also rejected the MPs' call for complaints such as that of Dr
Jones to be sent direct to the JIC chairman. "It is important to
preserve the line management authority of JIC members," it said.
Don't assume malice for what stupidity can explain.