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BATF Not Part of Homeland Security

Josey1Josey1 Member Posts: 9,598 ✭✭
edited June 2002 in General Discussion
ATF Not Part of Homeland Security
Tue Jun 11, 3:08 AM ET
By JEANNINE AVERSA, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - The agency responsible for tracking the country's guns and bombs isn't included in the plan to create a Cabinet agency for homeland security.

Photos

AP Photo


The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms would stay at its current home within the Treasury Department ( news - web sites).

"ATF's primary role of a law enforcement agency didn't meet threshold requirements," said Gordon Johndroe, a spokesman for the White House's Office of Homeland Security. "Their functions ... were not considered primarily a homeland security mission," he said.

Still, ATF has participated in high-profile investigations involving terrorist attacks in recent years.

The agency was credited with helping to crack the 1993 World Trade Center bombing case and played a key role in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing probe. Since Sept. 11 the agency has taken actions aimed at reducing the chances of terrorists obtaining handguns or explosives and tightened rules on foreigners buying guns.

Two other high-profile Treasury units - the Customs Service and the United States Secret Service - would be moved out of Treasury and folded into the new Homeland Security Department.

After the Sept. 11 attacks, Customs shifted its primary mission from detecting smuggled narcotics to stopping terrorists and weapons from getting into the country. The agency oversees roughly 300 points of entry - seaports, airports and border crossings on land - into the United States. Threat assessment is among the Secret Service ( news - web sites)'s duties.

ATF enforces federal laws and regulations not only on guns and explosives but also on beer, wine and liquor and a range of tobacco products.

Since Sept. 11, the agency has inspected 7,459 businesses and people licensed to handle explosives and urged them to take immediate measures to ensure the security of their inventories, ATF Director Bradley Buckles said in congressional testimony on April 17.

In a notice last month, ATF urged explosives makers and sellers to be "extra vigilant as we enter the summer holiday season," including July Fourth.

"Symbolism is an important aspect of terrorism, and large gatherings of people at parades and other events provide a target-rich environment for terrorist bombers," ATF's notice said.

Some at ATF privately have expressed surprise that the agency is not being folded into the new security department. "When you look at the Department of Homeland Security's mission, we feel there's a place in that for ATF," said one ATF official, speaking on condition of anonymity

Congress may still make that happen, or amid a massive reorganization may shift the ATF to some other department such as Justice, said the official.

As proposed by Bush, the new department would inherit 169,000 employees and $37.4 billion from agencies it would absorb, including not only Customs and Secret Service but also the Coast Guard, INS and others. However, the largest intelligence operations, including the FBI ( news - web sites), CIA ( news - web sites) and the National Security Agency, would remain separate.

___

On the Net: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms site: http://www.atf.treas.gov/

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20020611/ap_on_go_ot/atf_homeland_security_1


"If cowardly and dishonorable men sometimes shoot unarmed men with army pistols or guns, the evil must be prevented by the penitentiary and gallows, and not by a general deprivation of a constitutional privilege." - Arkansas Supreme Court, 1878

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  • Josey1Josey1 Member Posts: 9,598 ✭✭
    edited November -1
    Secrets of the service
    Pressures and problems confront the police agency that protects the president

    By Chitra Ragavan and Christopher H. Schmitt

    On Oct. 8, 1993, Secret Service Special Agent Kenneth Banner was working a fraud investigation in Los Angeles when he got a call from a female informant named Akilah Ife Hasan. She was a small-time crook with a long rap sheet, a modest talent for scams, and an unfortunate weakness for drugs. Hasan had some dirt on a case Banner was working, she said. Banner, a supervisor in the Secret Service's L.A. office, agreed to meet Hasan at a lounge called the Current Affair. One thing led to another, and the agent and informant wound up sharing drinks, then returning to Banner's Inglewood apartment for sex. Afterward, when Hasan didn't return from a visit to the bathroom, Banner went and found her on the floor, lifeless, according to a police report. He called paramedics, who transported Hasan's nude body to a local hospital. Hasan, 43, had died of a brain hemorrhage in Banner's apartment because of a "history of cocaine abuse," police and coroner's reports said. Police concluded there was no foul play. Banner, now a private investigator, acknowledged to U.S. News that an incident took place. But despite the official reports, he said, "No one died at my residence. That did not happen."


    In Houston two years ago, Secret Service Agent Sonna Prince Young tapped an old school pal who worked in the Texas state attorney general's office to help her steal money from a federal welfare program meant to feed poor kids. Court documents show that Young was illegally approved for the food vouchers, even though her combined annual income with her husband was more than three times as high as the eligibility level. She pleaded guilty to one count in federal court and was put on probation, fined $250, and ordered to pay $288 in restitution. She left the service.

    This February, a team of Secret Service agents assigned to Vice President Cheney's protective detail on a visit to the San Diego area finished their shift and decided to wind down at a local bar. The outing ended in a drunken brawl between four Secret Service agents and a horde of locals outside a lounge called the Daley Double. During the fracas-in which the agents were outnumbered 15 to four and had to flee on foot-one of Cheney's agents bit off the tip of one of the locals' ears. It was never recovered. Police were summoned to sort things out, and the officers filed a report listing the agents' address-1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C.

    For more than 137 years, the Secret Service has presented an image to the world of bravery, excellence, and patriotism. Few who saw it will ever forget Special Agent Timothy McCarthy taking a bullet, or Jerry Parr hurling his body on top of President Reagan, as John Hinckley emptied his .22-caliber revolver outside a Washington hotel two decades ago. Or Special Agent Rufus Youngblood covering Lyndon Johnson's body with his own after Lee Harvey Oswald opened fire with his Mannlicher-Carcano sniper rifle in Dealey Plaza in Dallas. Created in 1865 as a tiny Treasury Department agency to root out counterfeit-currency rings, the Secret Service was given the mission of protecting presidents more than 35 years later. Today, the Secret Service's protective mission extends to all retired presidents, the vice president, visiting heads of state, foreign missions, and a host of executive branch offices and residences. Just last week, President Bush proposed moving the Secret Service into a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security.

    Over the years since the Secret Service assumed its protective duties, thousands of plainclothes agents and officers in the agency's Uniformed Division have proudly upheld its official motto, "Worthy of Trust and Confidence." In 1999, in a speech dedicating the Secret Service's new headquarters in Washington, where the motto is boldly emblazoned, President Clinton lauded the values the service embodies. "Regardless of the times or the tasks," said Clinton, "there has always been a thread of honor and integrity, trust, and true, confident performance."

    But a U.S. News investigation shows that, at a time when the stakes for the Secret Service are higher than ever, the agency is rife with problems and resistant to oversight and correction. The troubles range from alcohol abuse and misuse of government property to criminal offenses and allegations of extramarital relationships by Secret Service personnel with White House employees. In response to questions from U.S. News, the Secret Service provided a detailed, four-page letter but declined to make senior managers, including Director Brian Stafford, available for interviews. "The Secret Service takes any allegations of breaches of professional conduct seriously and has a long history of addressing such issues," wrote Assistant Director Paul Irving, who heads the Office of Government and Public Affairs. Irving acknowledged that "without question," over the past 25 years, "we have had employees who have been involved in professional misconduct and in some cases, criminal behavior."

    Such incidents, current and former Secret Service personnel say, are tarnishing the image of an agency long lionized as the elite of the elite. And they have led many agents to raise questions about their organization's ability to fulfill its unique mission: protecting America's leaders. In a move scarcely known outside the agency, the Secret Service has recently begun implementing a new "protective methodology" that calls for using fewer agents and officers to cover "protectees." The plan is being viewed skeptically by some veteran agents and is at odds with the Secret Service's traditional strategy of "360-degree coverage." The agency declined to comment on any details regarding protection-citing security concerns. The change is being implemented at the same time the agency is taking on new duties by providing security at major events-more than a dozen since 1998-like the Super Bowl and the Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City. "Just as it has always done," Irving wrote, "the Secret Service is continuing to evaluate its need for additional resources in the post-September 11th environment."

    From its modest beginnings, the Secret Service today has grown into an $857 million annual operation, with a budget that has soared by 50 percent in the past five years. The Secret Service carries out its mission with a relatively small workforce, nearly 3,000 plainclothes agents and fewer than 1,000 Uniformed Division officers. The overworked and traditionally underappreciated officers are leaving in droves now, many to join the new Transportation Security Administration, created after the September 11 attacks. The service has lost 130 uniformed officers to TSA since January, according to Irving, who attributes these losses to a higher pay rate. "A large number of retired Secret Service agents now work for the Transportation Security Administration," Irving wrote, "and have been recruiting from the ranks of our agency." He says the service is hoping to increase its pay scale to prevent further attrition but concedes that more departures are inevitable. Defections in the elite corps of White House countersnipers, who stand watch on the roof of the presidential mansion, and even by K-9 officers, are further testing the agency's limits, sources say. After the TSA was created in November, so many uniformed officers began applying for jobs online from White House computers that the Secret Service blocked access, allowing officers to view application forms but not complete them. Secret Service brass refused time off for some officers to go to TSA for job interviews, according to service insiders. So one night, frustrated TSA recruiters showed up at the Secret Service Uniformed Division guard booth at the northwest gate of the White House to speak with job candidates. In a servicewide E-mail dated May 24, provided to U.S. News, Secret Service Director Stafford acknowledged the "continuous loss of personnel" due to "enormous overtime burdens." Said Stafford: "I'm well aware that the attrition rate of the Uniformed Division is at a critical level."

    The strains are manifest throughout the agency. The service has been forced to pull firearms instructors from its training academy and uniformed officers guarding foreign missions to work protective details, sources say. U.S. News has learned that plans are underway to post plainclothes agents in and around the White House, to replace departing uniformed officers. But plainclothes agents including experienced senior supervisors also are retiring-more than 60 since January alone. For the first time, young agents, too, are leaving in significant numbers. Internal statistics show that in all, nearly 85 agents have retired or quit and nearly 20 have transferred to other agencies since January. The attrition has caused alarm. "It's all smoke and mirrors," says a plainclothes agent. "We are like a giant ship teetering on toothpicks, waiting to collapse." Says another: "Our protective mission is in crisis." Despite the attrition and the increased responsibilities, Irving wrote, "[w]e are confident that we are able to carry out our investigative and protective responsibilities."

    U.S. News conducted in-depth interviews with more than a dozen veteran Secret Service agents and employees with intimate knowledge of the agency's inner workings. The magazine also spoke with dozens more state, local, and federal law enforcement officials who interact with the Secret Service. Most of the Secret Service personnel, fearing retaliation by supervisors, spoke on condition of anonymity but provided U.S. News with sworn statements of their accounts. The magazine supplemented that information with an extensive review of property, death, divorce, and police records, court pleadings, and evidentiary documents.

    The magazine's examination found violations of basic policies outlined in Secret Service training manuals. For instance, the agency's Special Investigation and Security manual says that when it comes to job applicants or senior officials, "extramarital sexual relationships are of concern in suitability or security determinations," especially giving access to "sensitive compartmentalized information" or highly classified information. The manual warns that such relationships, from a security standpoint, "can be important when the potential for undue influence or duress exists." Special Agent A. T. Smith was the head of Hillary Rodham Clinton's White House detail after serving on the Presidential Protective Detail (PPD). According to several sources and a divorce pleading filed by Smith's wife at the time alleging adultery, Smith was conducting a widely known extramarital relationship with Catherine Cornelius, President Clinton's cousin. Cornelius worked in the White House scheduling office around the time of the Monica Lewinsky affair. Smith accompanied Cornelius to numerous White House social events and eventually married her after the divorce from his wife. Smith declined a request for comment.

    Smith's relationship with Cornelius, and those of other agents on Clinton's detail with White House staffers, became an issue within the Secret Service, several current and former officials say. This was especially true after the Lewinsky scandal broke in January 1998 and Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr sought to question Secret Service officers and agents under oath regarding Clinton's relationship with Lewinsky. The service and its director at the time, Lewis Merletti, resisted testifying, asserting a "protective function privilege." In a legal fight the Secret Service eventually lost in the Supreme Court, Merletti said in court papers that if agents were forced to testify, it would compromise their anonymity and jeopardize their proximity to the president. Many agents believed Merletti's fight was mostly a principled one. But others were suspicious that Merletti had other concerns: that Starr's inquiry would turn up information about personal indiscretions allegedly involving top personnel at the Secret Service, including Merletti himself. Merletti at one time was head of Clinton's detail. So was Stafford. In affidavits provided to U.S. News, six current Secret Service agents stated that Merletti and Stafford, while protecting Clinton during the Lewinsky scandal, were widely believed to be involved in extramarital relationships with women who worked in the White House. In a June 2000 legal deposition in a federal employment discrimination lawsuit against the service, former Special Agent in Charge Ralph Grayson alleged that though the service knew about Stafford's relationship with the staffer, the agency promoted Stafford. Several agents said that these alleged relationships-Merletti's, Stafford's, Smith's, and those involving other agents on the PPD-were the subject of widespread discussion within the Uniformed Division, among agents at Secret Service headquarters, in several field offices, and among White House staffers. These agents, who asked not to be identified, say that there was speculation among agents and officers that the service was claiming the "protective function privilege" in order to prevent these relationships from coming to light. The former White House staffer allegedly involved with Merletti issued a written denial of any relationship. Merletti, in a letter to U.S. News, "emphatically" denied any relationship. "The claim of privilege," said Merletti, "was invoked precisely and exclusively as publicly stated and strongly supported by every living former director of the United States Secret Service as well as former President Bush."

    Merletti told U.S. News that "rumors of the type you have raised were in fact inquired into by the Office of the Independent Counsel and were debunked and found absolutely lacking in credibility or foundation." But Solomon Wisenberg, a former top Starr prosecutor, rejected that claim. "That's preposterous," said Wisenberg, who is now in private practice. While not confirming that Merletti had been questioned, Wisenberg said, "it was never a part of our mandate to look into the sexual peccadilloes of Secret Service employees." In his letter, Irving also emphasized that the privilege was invoked "because of an overarching national interest that requires the most zealous protection." The former White House staffer named in Grayson's deposition as having had a relationship with Stafford did not return phone calls. Stafford, through a spokesman, also declined to respond.

    In the end, Starr's lawyers questioned more than 30 Uniformed Division officers and agents and one supervisor of the PPD, Larry Cockell, who took over the presidential detail from Stafford in 1998, when Stafford assumed the directorship. Neither Merletti nor Stafford testified before the grand jury. "We wanted to be able to interview those with information, while being sensitive to and balancing the needs of the agency,'' Starr said in an interview. "We didn't want to needlessly intrude into their work.''

    The Lewinsky episode clearly took a toll on the Secret Service, but current and former service personnel say they are more concerned now about what they describe as a growing number of personal and professional lapses. In mid-February, Secret Service agents visited Clayton Greenhalgh's Salt Lake City snowboard shop to pick up some souvenir Olympics hats. After they left, Greenhalgh was shocked to find a step-by-step plan for protecting Vice President Cheney at the closing ceremony of the winter games. The document ran to more than a dozen pages. Details included where Cheney would sit, who would be near him, and how he would enter and depart the facility, Rice-Eccles Stadium. The document also described precisely where Cheney's protective detail would be located and how it would be armed. It included specifics of Cheney's movements in stairwells and enumerated what rooms would be closed off from the time Cheney arrived until the moment he departed. "Basically," Greenhalgh told U.S. News, it covered "Vice President Cheney's every move ... I happened to be in the right place at the right time, but if the right bad person found that, something really bad could have happened."

    As embarrassing as the breach was, the Secret Service wasn't terribly interested in getting its security plan back, Greenhalgh recalls. Alarmed by what he'd found, Greenhalgh called the Salt Lake City Secret Service office. "They said they'd send someone right over," he says. Nearly an hour later, no one had shown up. Greenhalgh called again. "They said, 'If you could bring it down to us, maybe that would be better.' " Greenhalgh obliged. After turning the document over, he asked an agent if he might get a picture of the vice president for his troubles. "She said, 'I work for him, and I can't get a picture, so why should you?' " Greenhalgh recalls. The next day, two agents showed up at Greenhalgh's shop to grill him. "They were both terribly rude," Greenhalgh says. "They were talking to me like I did something wrong. I was put off 100 percent." Irving said that employees "should have demonstrated greater care, in safeguarding this information." But, he added, "the information contained was not classified and, even if compromised, would not have altered or affected our overall security plan." He said none of the agents has been disciplined.

    Other, less public incidents raise questions about the levels of stress many Secret Service employees must contend with and the ability of agency supervisors to monitor problems. Some examples:

    In Los Angeles, an agent guarding former President Ronald Reagan was found guilty in 1997 of having sex with a 16-year-old girl, possession of methamphetamine, and violently resisting arrest. The case came to light when the girl's father-a close friend of Agent Timothy O'Brien's-saw his daughter returning from the agent's house next door one morning, wearing only pajamas. Testimony indicated that O'Brien had sex with the girl for hours, often night after night, then gave her tabs of methamphetamine, or "speed," to help keep her awake during school the next day. When the girl's father confronted O'Brien, the agent drew his service weapon and threatened to shoot him, says William Pounders, the Los Angeles Superior Court judge who presided over O'Brien's trial. O'Brien was arrested at gunpoint but only after a brawl with two officers, in which one was injured. While O'Brien was not charged with perjury, in court, he lied repeatedly, says Richard Rosenthal, the Los Angeles County prosecutor who handled the case. "He was the worst perjurer I think I saw," Rosenthal said, "in 15 years of being a prosecutor." Pounders says, "In 18 years as a judicial officer, I have never had another case involving so many violations of so many different laws by someone who should have been above reproach." Testimony indicated that O'Brien-who said he had done advance work for President George H. W. Bush and been given specialized counterterrorism training-had taken methamphetamine while on a training trip to Washington. He had not been drug-tested since 1991. "The testing was minuscule-shockingly minimal, considering the circumstances," says James Blatt, O'Brien's attorney. "This was an eye-opener for all of us. We all thought of the Secret Service as this mystical agency that could do no wrong. It's not the case." O'Brien, fired by the Secret Service, was sentenced to six years in prison.

    In August 1999, Washington police were called to Lulu's Bar in Washington, "where every day is Mardi Gras," as the bar proclaims. Two men had gotten into an altercation in the restroom, patrons said, and it ended in a shooting that left both men injured. One was an Air Force enlisted man. The other was Secret Service Agent Manuel Puente, recently transferred to join the PPD. The injuries were not life threatening. Puente was told to leave the force. Efforts to reach him were unsuccessful.

    In October 1999, Kenneth Blake, a thief who scoured Chicago-area hotels to steal handbags, dropped in at the Fairmont Hotel, where then first lady Hillary Clinton was staying. Secret Service Agent Mary Drury, a member of the Clinton detail, was at a hotel bar with another agent around 11 p.m., in violation of a strict service policy against agents drinking while carrying a gun. When Blake pilfered her purse, he took her .357-caliber Sig Sauer service weapon. It was the second time Drury had lost her gun, several knowledgeable sources say, and she had been promoted a grade between the first and second incident. In another incident, in 1993, Drury was driving home from a Chicago bar when she rammed her government car into a Chicago Transit Authority bus so hard that several items flew out of the trunk. Drury has not received any significant sanction from the Secret Service. Drury did not return phone calls. The service declined to comment. Blake received a 40-month prison term.

    Law enforcement is among the world's most demanding professions, and given their unique responsibilities, Secret Service personnel can face higher stress levels than most cops. Special agents outside Washington spend long stretches away from their families, traveling for at least 30 days every 10 weeks. Many in the capital say they're burned out from the long hours they've put in since September 11. Many uniformed officers have been told they must work on one of their normal days off. Agents posted at the service's 118 field offices nationwide regularly wind up dropping criminal investigations they're working on to take their turn on the PPD in Washington. If an agent working with or on the PPD is exhausted, angry, or compromised in some way, current and former agents worry, it could jeopardize the safety of the president or other protectees.

    The concerns are not ill founded. Several years ago, members of Clinton's protective advance team were alarmed to find that an unidentified group was following them and tracking their movements. Current agents declined to discuss any protective matters, but several sources say that since then, the Secret Service has implemented a new policy of sending a separate team of agents to watch the backs of the agents doing the advance planning for trips by high-level protectees. They have modeled their new security plan on the British Secret Service.

    FITNESS FOR DUTY

    Threats like that, even before September 11, are precisely why so many still in the service, and others who have recently left, are concerned by the lapses they say they're seeing now. In just the past few months, there have been several instances of Secret Service agents' driving under the influence of alcohol, even to their posts at the White House. One agent received no punishment. The other agent was taken off the PPD. He had had a previous incident involving alcohol, sources say, an incident that not only went unsanctioned but that didn't prevent a promotion to the president's detail. In the San Diego bar-fight incident, the service says, it took no formal disciplinary action against the agents. According to a 20-page report by the Treasury Department's inspector general, the Secret Service has tolerated alcohol-related misconduct by employees. In August 1995, according to the report, an officer received a "fitness for duty" exam only after four incidents of suspected drunken driving in an eight-month period. In one of those cases, police at the scene confiscated the officer's service weapon for fear of what the officer might do. Still, the officer remained on the force-until he was convicted, in February 1999, of driving while intoxicated. Only then did the service issue him a "proposal for removal" for "conduct unbecoming" an officer. Other details of the case could not be learned.

    Showing up for work intoxicated could obviously result in a security breach. But some instances of public drunkenness involving Secret Service personnel simply blemish the Secret Service's storied history of service and valor. In late January, a contingent of about 20 Secret Service agents bunked in at the Western Inn motel in Provo, Utah, on security assignment to the Winter Olympics in nearby Salt Lake City. In the wee hours of February 1, some of the agents hosted a loud party, leading resident manager Casey Clements to plead for quiet. Clements also asked the agents, who he said were clearly inebriated, to stop smoking. "They said, 'We don't have to do anything we don't want,' " Clements recalls. An hour later, the noise grew louder. Clements called the room. Someone hung up. He made another visit, pushing against a partially open door behind which an agent was peering out. "That upset him," Clements says. "He pushed me out of the door and said if I did that again, he'd throw me to the ground, put a gun to my head, and I'd be sorry." Days later, it was learned that the officers may have been drinking with several teenage girls. Local police have been investigating whether a sexual assault took place, after hearing of the incident indirectly. The service had not reported to Utah authorities any involvement of the agents with the girls. The Utah County attorney's office is investigating; the Secret Service is cooperating. The episode left Clements with a bad feeling. "I guess I don't trust law enforcement like I used to," he says. "The agents that threatened me, they were just, like, 'We're above the law.' " Spokesman Irving says one of the three special agents resigned. The other two remain "in an administrative leave status," says Irving, "pending possible prosecutorial action."

    TEMPTATION

    The U.S. News inquiry revealed other problems. Secret Service agents assigned to the elite Counter Assault Team (CAT), which responds to any attack on the president, sometimes watch pornography on White House satellite channels in the "band room" in the basement of the executive mansion. That's where the CAT stashes its weapons and the Marine Band keeps its instruments. When the president and first lady retire for the night, several sources say, agents will often "put some skin on." Other agents watch pornographic videotapes on the ground floor of the mansion but only after posting an agent as a lookout, the sources add. If a female Uniformed Division officer approaches, the posted agent clicks three times in an agent's earpiece, to give him time to change channels.

    In Miami and Ohio, according to sworn affidavits by several agents, Secret Service supervisors brought professional strippers into the offices. In Miami, Special Agent-in-Charge Jack Kippenberger reportedly permitted a male stripper into Secret Service offices for a female employee's bridal shower. The incident might have passed unnoticed had it not been for Kippenberger's prior refusal-on security grounds-to allow another agency employee to bring in a guest to organize games for her bridal shower. The incident brought a swarm of inspectors from Washington, and Kippenberger, sources say, was given a two-week suspension. He chose to take it at the end of the year, during the Christmas holidays, just before he retired. Kippenberger did not return phone calls. In Columbus, Ohio, Special Agent-in-Charge Irwin Cohen allegedly paid for a stripper from the Strip-a-Gram agency (motto: "You've been strip-a-grammed!") into the Secret Service office there to celebrate the birthday of another agent. Penny Steward, who ran the now defunct striptease service, recalls being whisked in and out of the federal building. "I'm sure we weren't supposed to be there," Steward recalls. Someone in Cohen's office sent pictures of the incident-obtained by U.S. News-to service headquarters, sources say, but no action was taken. Cohen declined to comment to U.S. News except to say "those things were discussed years ago."

    What is most disturbing to many current and former Secret Service employees is when agents or officers violate the fundamental trust underlying their jobs.

    Two years ago, Michael Cohen, a veteran agent mentoring a group of rookie agents in the Philadelphia office, embezzled some $2,800 from the Secret Service in two incidents. According to court documents and an interview with prosecutors, Cohen claimed to be a couple of thousand dollars short on a house-closing payment; when agents turned over $3,173 seized in a criminal investigation, Cohen kept some $2,000 and faked a $1,159 receipt for the balance. The case troubled prosecutor Amy Kurland. "He was so cavalier about taking $2,000," recalls Kurland. "Somebody who does that so easily is not someone who hasn't done that before. It wasn't a one-time, spur-of-the-moment, take-the-opportunity kind of theft." According to court testimony and an interview with Cohen's attorney, when Cohen was drawing in one of the other young agents into his scam, and the agent expressed concerns, Cohen said, "This is the way we did it all the time in Kansas City." Cohen drew a 33-month prison term. He is free pending appeal.

    In October 2000, based on information from a confidential informant, two Secret Service agents were criss-crossing Miami-area streets, monitoring a pair of thieves as they methodically ripped off cash from ATM machines. At the end of the day, it came time to make the arrests. But the agents had a dilemma: how not to blow the cover of their informant, who was accompanying the thieves. According to court documents and interviews with attorneys, the agents decided to allow the informant to run away, giving the appearance of an escape. That's what they did. But when the agents reported the case to the U.S. attorney's office, they told prosecutors there were three ATM thieves, not two. A possible motive: James Smith, a high-ranking officer in the agency's Miami office, pocketed $1,309 of the cash nabbed from the ATM thefts, perhaps the informant's share. Prosecutors began investigating. The agents' story soon unraveled. The prosecutors were forced to void the convictions of the ATM thieves. Earlier this year, Smith got five months' prison time.

    With their jobs providing ready access to cash, temptation isn't far away for Secret Service agents. Office funds meant to pay confidential informants was an obvious lure for William Ebert, a career agent who by the early 1990s had worked his way up through the ranks to a critical posting: head of the Secret Service's counterfeiting division. This was back when "supernotes," high-quality counterfeit bills, were beginning to show up in quantity around the country, eluding the best detection efforts. Ebert got tripped up in a scheme in which he was submitting phony vouchers and pocketing money meant for confidential informants and others. He had been buying expensive airline tickets and then getting refunds; double-billing on other tickets; and claiming phony payments to informants, in the United States and overseas. Ebert was sentenced to five months in prison followed by home confinement. He agreed to pay $29,900 in restitution and received a five-month prison term.

    ACCOUNTABILITY

    Many believe that at the root of such problems is a lack of accountability within the Secret Service. A government official familiar with the agency says the service has effectively used its Office of Inspection to sweep problems under the rug, seeking to prevent the inspector general (IG) of the Treasury Department-the service's parent agency-from opening and conducting investigations. In the past, this official says, the service circumvented the IG by classifying misconduct allegations as "management issues," thus keeping problems in-house, or in agency parlance, "in the family." Within the service, many current and former officials say, the "code of silence" is a time-honored tradition. Inspector General Jeffrey Rush says his office could have missed investigating some misconduct. In another area, a Treasury Department report, dated Oct. 31, 2001, concluded that investigators from the inspector general's staff "encountered a Secret Service policy hindering our access to its employees and records." That policy required agents and officers contacted by the Treasury IG's office to notify Secret Service headquarters. "It's like the cat and the bell," says Rush. "The mice like it, but the cat's got a job to do." Rush says he complained about the policy to Congress. The new policy still requires notification-not by agents but by the IG himself-before employees are contacted.

    But the IG's office also is partly to blame for the inadequate oversight of the Secret Service. Rush acknowledges that, until he recently made changes, the IG routinely reviewed only cases involving complaints against senior managers, while ignoring things like complaints against Secret Service inspectors-the officials charged with policing the agency. Weak oversight and the ability of Secret Service inspectors to handle many problems in-house have contributed to morale problems in the agency, current and former employees say, because of a widespread belief that punishment for misconduct is administered arbitrarily. A February 2001 review by the Treasury IG of the Secret Service Inspection Division came to the same conclusion. The report said that in nearly a quarter of the 75 discipline files reviewed, discipline was not administered either consistently or in a timely manner. "We found that the USSS [U.S. Secret Service] has no centralized tracking or reporting system for employee misconduct allegations," said the report. "And they are therefore unable to track misconduct allegations that were handled as management issues."

    DOUBLE STANDARD

    All this is not to say that wrongdoers are never punished. Secret Service managers have taken many agents to task, but many remain on the force and continue to rise, despite lapses and abuses. What is galling, some agents and officers say, is a double standard that exists for employees who have relationships with Secret Service brass. If you have a "hook," the saying goes, you can sometimes get off the hook. If you don't and you incur the service's wrath, beware. In those instances, some service personnel say, the agency can go to extraordinary lengths to investigate suspected wrongdoing. Patrick Cruise is a former special agent in the Secret Service's Miami field office. In lawsuits filed against the service, Cruise alleges the special agent in charge suspected that he was abusing drugs because Cruise was dating a young part-time administrative employee who the service suspected was doing drugs. On Sept. 29, 1999, when Cruise wound up in the hospital sick with suspected hepatitis, he says, the service asked another agent's wife who worked as a clerk in that hospital to steal his medical records so it could confirm the suspicions about drugs. A toxicology test, which included a routine screening for drug use, was presumed positive. Cruise says the hospital failed to do the necessary follow-up test to confirm the result. His supervisor visited him in the hospital soon afterward, Cruise says, bringing Ben & Jerry's chocolate brownie ice cream and a Maxim girlie magazine. But the real reason for the visit, Cruise says, was to get him to sign a medical release so the Secret Service could obtain the toxicology test results legally so it would have the paper records it would need in any legal proceeding after firing him. After Cruise was diagnosed with mononucleosis and discharged, Cruise says, the Secret Service ordered him to submit to a urinalysis and a forensic hair test that can detect drug use dating back months. Both were negative. Several weeks later, says Cruise, he was fired for leaving his duty post and going to the bathroom. Cruise has sued the hospital for malpractice and negligence and has filed a federal equal employment opportunity complaint against the service. He also has a federal suit pending to get his job reinstated. "Years ago if you would have spoken to me, I would have nothing negative to say about them. They were the best thing in the world," says Cruise. "I would defend the Secret Service until I was blue in the face. Now, I have nothing good to say."

    With Marianne Lavelle, Edward T. Pound, Anne Bradley, Sheila Thalhimer, and Carol Hook

    http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/020617/usnews/17secret.htm


    "If cowardly and dishonorable men sometimes shoot unarmed men with army pistols or guns, the evil must be prevented by the penitentiary and gallows, and not by a general deprivation of a constitutional privilege." - Arkansas Supreme Court, 1878
  • Josey1Josey1 Member Posts: 9,598 ✭✭
    edited November -1
    The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
    National Church Arson Task Force




    MESSAGE FROM NATIONAL CHURCH ARSON TASK FORCE
    The burning of churches is a particularly heinous crime because those who would attack our churches seek to strike at our most fundamental liberties and sources of personal support. Historically, churches have served as places of sanctuary, centers of the community, and symbols of freedom. The National Church Arson Task Force is committed to fully applying our investigative resources to determine the cause of those fires and arrest and prosecute those responsible for the arsons.

    One aspect of this commitment is the dissemination of the Church Threat Assessment guide. It contains valuable information on the steps that may be taken to prevent fires at churches, the steps to follow after an incident has occurred, the toll free telephone number, 1-888-ATF-FIRE, and the telephone numbers of ATF and FBI offices for providing authorities information about any acts of violence, or threats of violence, directed at churches nationwide.

    We must all work together to solve and prevent these despicable crimes. With your continued assistance and support, and your cooperation in applying the recommendations contained within this booklet, churches and congregations will be better protected from this type of violence.

    James E. Johnson
    Assistant Secretary
    of the Treasury
    (Enforcement)
    Deval L. Patrick
    Assistant Attorney General
    for Civil Rights
    John W. Magaw
    Director,
    Bureau of Alcohol,
    Tobacco and Firearms
    Louis Freeh
    Director,
    Federal Bureau
    of Investigation





    CHURCH THREAT ASSESSMENT GUIDE

    The following is a guide to assessing church vulnerability to arson and bombing attacks. It should not be considered all inclusive. Your local Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) office, FBI office, fire, police or sheriff's department should be con-tacted for additional guidance concerning a specific plan for your church.

    Area Of Vulnerability

    Churches located in isolated or rural areas.
    Churches left unattended for extended periods of time.
    Churches with unsecured doors and/or uncovered windows leave weak points for forced entry by intruders.
    The absence of an adequate burglar alarm system provides a determined criminal with additional time for criminal activity.
    Heavy shrubs and outside vegetation, and/or the absence of sufficient perimeter lighting, provides security for criminals, not victims.

    Affirmative Actions To Reduce Vulnerability

    Install perimeter floodlights outside the building.
    Criminals can conceal their presence and activity from witnesses at night. Adequate lighting that illuminates all points of entry (doors, windows, skylights, etc.) discour-ages them. Interior lights in areas visible through exterior windows should be left on during all hours of darkness. Exterior lights should have protective screens over them to prevent vandalism. All lights should be checked weekly for serviceability. Rela-tively inexpensive motion activated and/or timing equipment may be purchased to automatically turn lights on and off.


    Install an adequate fire and burglar alarm system.
    Alarms should be installed by reputable local companies that can service and pro-perly maintain the equipment. Please note that some municipalities or police depart-ments have enacted burglar alarm standards and will not respond to false alarms by inferior systems that frequently cause false alarms. Check with your local police or sheriff's department.


    Solid wood or sheet metal faced doors provide extra integrity that a hollow core wooden door cannot. Metal security grates or screens that cover the entire door and frame also provide added security.
    A steel door frame that properly fits the door is as important as the construction of the door.

    With the proper foundation of a sufficient door and frame, the most obvious consider-ation, door locks, can be addressed. Long throw dead bolts of hardened steel are excellent deterrents to forced entry. Many standard locks are easy to pick or break open. Do remember that exits must remain operable for fire and life safety reasons.


    Install burglar-proof bars on screens, and large roof vents to prohibit access through them. However, it should be noted that aesthetic or fire safety considerations often preclude their use. If bars are used, they should be operable from interior and not limit exit or evacuation of building. Local ordinances should be researched BEFORE costly security renovations are undertaken.
    Windows are common points of entry for criminals, regardless of their height from the ground. Burglars can open unlocked windows, break glass and unlock locked windows, saw through metal or wooden frames, or pry entire window frames from exterior walls.


    Heavy shrubs and vines should be kept low to the ground to reduce their potential to conceal criminals or incendiary or explosive devices. Large trees or vines should be removed to prevent criminals from climbing to upper windows, large vents, or onto the roof.

    Participate in formal Neighborhood Watch type programs organized by local authorities.

    Meet with your neighbors and security personnel assigned to your neighboring businesses. Explain your situation and ask them to keep an eye on your church.

    Educate personnel on methods to deal with telephoned threats and conducting bomb searches. Develop a written protocol for threats and keep it posted.

    Document any strange or threatening phone calls. Talk with the phone company about tracing your lines or installing Caller ID to identify your callers if you are receiv-ing threats.

    If a suspicious package or letter is received, immediately call your local police or sheriff's department. Do not touch or manipulate the object in any manner. Be alert for letters or packages that display an excessive amount of postage, contain grease stains, or have unfamiliar or missing return addresses. (See the "SUSPECT LETTER AND PACKAGE INDICATORS " page)

    Keep the handling of threatening correspondence, once identified, to an absolute minimum. Place envelopes, letters or the packages in clear plastic bags and do not compress the bag. Store them in another location until they can be turned over to law enforcement.

    On a rotating basis, have a member of the congregation, who is at least 18 years of age, check on the church daily. Evaluate the need for a security guard for nights and weekends.

    Obtain as detailed a physical description as possible of any suspicious person(s) noticed in or around your facility, including a description of vehicles and license numbers. (Refer to enclosed worksheet, "Suspect Description")

    Duplicate all documents, computer disks, and records that are stored at the church. Complete a comprehensive inventory of all furniture and equipment, to include serial numbers and value. Evaluate insurance coverage frequently.

    Remove all potential fire hazards from the church grounds, such as trash, lawn clippings and debris. Store all combustible materials in a locked room, shed, etc.

    CAUTIONARY NOTES:
    A. DO NOT allow watch persons to sleep inside the church

    B. The carrying of firearms, nightsticks, mace, or any type of weapon while conducting surveillance or participating in church watch programs should not be permitted.

    C. DO NOT approach a suspicious person, challenge anyone, or otherwise place yourself in jeopardy. If a suspicious situation is found, report it to the nearest law enforcement agency. Take detailed, legible notes of the activity, which may be used later for court or police purposes.

    D. DO NOT pursue vehicle or suspects.

    E. Remember, you do not possess police powers and you are liable as an individual for civil and criminal charges should you exceed your authority. The key is to OBSERVE and REPORT.

    F. DO NOT allow anyone to check on the church after having consumed alcohol. Do not allow anyone to stand watch and consume alcohol.

    G. If possible, conduct the watch patrol in pairs.

    H. Conduct watches in a random fashion and not in an observable pattern.


    OTHER CRIMES AGAINST CHURCHES
    It is a crime if your place of worship is defaced or vandalized. Also, should any of the members of your congregation be threatened or intimidated by an individual or group obstructing their free exercise of religious beliefs, immediately contact local law enforce-ment authorities and the nearest FBI office. All of the above incidents are serious matters which the FBI can and will investigate under Federal Civil Rights Statutes.


    CONCLUSION
    Please realize that a perfect security system does not exist and that some of these recommendations may or may not be practical for a place of worship. However, these suggestions can reduce the potential for an arson, bombing, vandalism or burglary at your church. Many of the listed security measures are quite expensive and may be be-yond the means of many churches. Local police crime prevention sections are excellent sources for security evaluations and suggestions. Also, local fire departments can pro-vide on-site fire safety and arson prevention inspections. They will assist you in prioritiz-ing your needs within your budget constraints.

    We realize these recommendations are not all inclusive. We welcome your ideas for improving this assessment and also the descriptions of any measures you have taken, not contained within this guide, that should be shared with other congregations. Please contact the Task Force through our Toll Free number, 1-888-ATF-FIRE, to provide this information.

    Through the Clearinghouse for Arson Prevention Resources, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is making available an assortment of arson prevention brochures and pamphlets. Technical assistance on the development of arson watch teams is also available. Requests for arson prevention workshops, as well as for on-site safety inspections of houses of worship can be made through the Clearinghouse. If you are interested in arson prevention information, please contact the Clearinghouse toll-free by dialing 1-888-603-3100. FEMA has also added a special section to its World Wide Web site (http://www.fema.gov) in support of the National Arson Prevention Initiative.








    NATIONAL CHURCH ARSON TASK FORCE



    ATF National Arson Hotline Toll Free 1-888-ATF-FIRE
    (Operational 24 Hours A Day)

    ATF National Bomb HOTLINE Toll Free 1-888-ATF-BOMB
    (Operational 24 Hours A Day)

    Clearinghouse For Arson Prevention Resources Toll Free 1-888-603-3100



    ATF LAW ENFORCEMENT FIELD OFFICES



    Atlanta Field Division: 404-331-6526

    Atlanta, GA. (Arson II Group) 404-331-6436
    Macon, GA. 912-474-0477
    Savannah, GA. 912-652-4251

    Baltimore Field Division: 410-962-0897

    Baltimore, MD. (Group I) 410-962-4115
    Hyattsville, MD. 301-436-8313
    Wilmington, DE. 302-573-6102

    Birmingham Field Division: 205-731-1205

    Birmingham, AL. 205-731-1111

    Gulfport, MS. 601-863-4871
    Huntsville, AL. 205-539-0623
    Jackson, MS. 601-965-4205
    Mobile, AL. 334-441-5338
    Montgomery, AL. 333-223-7507
    Oxford, MS. 601-234-3751

    Boston Field Division: 617-565-7042

    Boston (Group I/Arson) 617-565-7050
    Burlington (Willston,VT.) 802-463-3238
    Hartford, CT. 203-240-3185
    New Haven, CT. 203-773-2060
    Portland, ME. 207-780-3324

    Boston Field Division: 617-565-7042

    Concord, NH. 603-225-1547
    Providence, RI. 401-528-4366
    Springfield, MA. 413-785-0007
    Worchester, MA. 508-793-0240

    Charlotte Field Division: 704-344-6125

    Charlotte, NC. (Group I) 704-344-6126
    Charlotte, NC. (Group II) 704-344-6119
    Charleston, SC. 803-727-4275
    Columbia, SC. 803-765-5723
    Fayetteville, NC. 910-483-3030
    Greenville, SC. 864-232-3221
    Greensboro, NC. 910-547-4224
    Raleigh, NC. 919-856-4366
    Wilmington, NC. 910-343-4936

    Cleveland Field Division: 216-522-7210

    Cincinnati, OH. 513-684-3354
    Cleveland, OH. 216-522-308O/3786
    Columbus, OH. 614-469-6717
    Toledo, OH. 419-259-7520
    Youngstown, OH. 216-747-8285

    Chicago Field Division: 312-353-6935

    Chicago, IL. (Arson Group) 312-886-5441
    Oakbrook, IL. 708-268-0986/1274
    Springfield, IL. 217-492-4273
    Merrillville, IN. 219-791-0702

    Dallas Field Division: 214-767-2250

    Dallas, TX. (Arson Group) 214-767-0530
    Fort Worth, TX. 817-334-2771
    Lubbock, TX. 806-798-1030
    Oklahoma, TX. 405-297-5060
    Tyler, TX. 903-592-3927
    Tulsa, OK. 918-581-7731

    Detroit Field Division: 313-393-6019

    Detroit, MI. (Arson Group) 313-393-6036
    Flint, MI. 810-766-5010
    Grand Rapids, MI. 616-456-2566

    Houston Field Division: 713-449-2073

    Austin, TX. 512-349-4545
    Beaumont, TX. 409-835-0062
    Corpus Christi, TX. 512-888-3392
    El Paso, TX. 915-534-6449
    Houston, TX (Arson Group) 713-449-2093
    McAllen, TX. 210-687-5207
    San Antonio, TX. 210-805-2727
    Waco, TX. 817-741-9900

    Kansas City Field Division: 816-421-3440

    Colorado Springs, CO. 719-473-0166
    Des Moines, IA. 515-284-4372
    Denver, CO. (Arson/Explosives Group) 303-866-1173
    Kansas City, MO. (Arson Group) 816-421-3231
    Omaha, NE. 402-221-3651
    Springfield, MO. 417-864-4707
    Wichita, KS. 316-269-6229

    Los Angeles Field Division: 213-894-4812

    Los Angeles, CA. (Arson Group) 213-894-4840
    Long Beach, CA. 310-980-3434
    Riverside, CA. 909-276-6031
    San Diego, CA. 619-557-6663
    Van Nuys, CA. 818-756-4350

    Louisville Field Division: 502-582-5211

    Ashland, KY. 606-329-8092
    Bowling Green, KY. 502-781-7090
    Ft. Wayne, IN. 219-424-4440
    Indianapolis, IN. 317-226-7464
    Lexington, KY. 606-233-2771
    Louisville, KY. (Field Office) 502-582-5213

    Miami Field Division: 305-597-4800

    Jacksonville, FL. 904-232-2228
    Ft. Lauderdale, FL. 954-356-7369
    Ft. Myers, FL. 813-334-8086
    Miami Field Division (Continued): 305-597-4800

    Hato Rey San Juan, PR. 809-766-5084
    Miami, FL. 305-597-4778/4807
    Orlando, FL. 407-648-6136
    Pensacola, FL. 904-435-8485
    St. Croix, VI. 809-692-9435
    St. Thomas, VI. 809-774-5757
    Tallahassee, FL. 904-942-9660
    Tampa, FL. 813-228-2184
    West Palm Beach, FL. 407-835-8878

    Nashville Field Division: 615-781-5364

    Chattanooga, TN. 423-855-6422
    Knoxville, TN. 423-545-4505
    Memphis, TN. 901-766-2904

    New Orleans Field Divison: 504-589-2350

    Baton Rouge, LA. 504-389-0485
    Little Rock, AR. 501-324-6181
    New Orleans, LA. (Arson Group) 504-589-2314/2563
    Shreveport, LA. 318-676-3301

    New York Field Division: 212-264-4658

    Albany, NY. 518-431-4182
    Buffalo, NY. 716-551-4041
    Melville, NY. 516-694-8372
    New York (Arson Group) 718-896-6400
    Newark, NJ. (Arson Group) 201-357-4070
    Rochester, NY. 716-262-2110
    Syracuse, NY. 315-448-0889

    Philadelphia Field Division: 215-597-7266

    Atlantic City, NJ. 609-625-2228
    Camden, NJ. 609-968-4884
    Harrisburg, PA. 717-782-3884
    Philadelphia, PA. (Arson Group) 215-597-9080
    Pittburgh, PA. (Arson Group) 412-644-2911
    Reading, PA. 610-320-5222
    Trenton, NJ. 609-989-2155
    Wheeling, WV. 304-232-4170

    Phoenix Field Division: 602-640-2840

    Albuquerque, NM. 505-766-2271
    Phoenix, AR.(Field Office) 602-640-205
    Tucson, AR. 520-670-4725/4882

    San Francisco Field Division: 415-744-7001

    Bakersfield, CA. 805-861-4420
    Fresno, CA. 209-487-5393
    Las Vegas, NV. 702-388-6584
    Reno, NV. 702-784-5251
    Oakland, CA. 510-637-3431
    Sacramento, CA. 916-498-5100
    Salt Lake City, UT. 801-524-5853
    San Francisco, CA. (Arson Group) 415-744-7012

    Seattle Field Dvision: 206-220-6440

    Agana, GUAM 671-472-7129
    Anchorage, AK. 907-271-5701
    Billings, MT. 406-657-6886
    Boise, ID. 208-334-1983
    Cheyenne, WY. 307-772-2346
    Helena, MT. 406-441-1101
    Honolulu, HI. 808-541-2670
    Portland, OR. 503-326-2171
    Seattle, WA. (Arson Group) 206-220-6450
    Spokane, WA. 509-353-2862
    Yakima, WA. 509-454-4403

    St. Louis Field Division: 314-425-5560

    Cape Girardeau, MO. 573-335-3163
    Fairview Heights, IL. 618-632-9380
    St. Louis, MO. (Field Offices) 314-425-5563/5551

    St. Paul Field Division: 612-290-3092

    Fargo, ND. 701-239-5176
    Milwaukee, WI. 414-297-3937
    Sioux Falls, SD. 605-330-4368
    St. Paul, MN.(Field Office) 612-290-3459

    WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISION: 202-219-7751

    Bristol, VA. 540-466-2727
    Falls Church, VA. (Arson Group) 703-285-2551
    Norfolk, VA. 804-441-3190
    Richmond, VA. 804-560-0005
    Roanoke, VA. 540-857-2300



    Federal Bureau of Investigation


    FBI Field Office Phone Number FBI Field Office Phone Number



    Albany, NY 518-465-7551 Memphis, TN 901-747-4300
    Albuquerque, NM 505-224-2000 Miami, FL 305-944-9101
    Anchorage, AK 907-258-5322 Milwaukee, WI 414-276-4684
    Atlanta, GA 404-679-9000 Minneapolis, MN 612-376-3200
    Baltimore, MD 410-265-8080 Mobile, AL 334-438-3674
    Birmingham, AL 205-252-7705 Newark, NJ 201-622-5613
    Boston, MA 617-742-5533 New Haven, CT 203-777-6311
    Buffalo, NY 716-856-7800 New Orleans, LA 504-522-4671
    Charlotte, NC 704-377-9200 New York City, NY 212-384-1000
    Chicago, IL 312-431-1333 Norfolk, VA 804-455-0100
    Cincinnati, OH 513-421-4310 Oklahoma City, OK 405-842-7471
    Cleveland, OH 216-522-1400 Omaha, NE 402-493-8688
    Columbia, SC 803-254-3011 Philadelphia, PA 215-829-2700
    Dallas, TX 214-720-2200 Phoenix, AZ 602-279-5511
    Denver, CO 303-629-7171 Pittsburgh, PA 412-471-2000
    Detroit, Ml 313-965-2323 Portland, OR 503-224-4181
    El Paso, TX 915-533-7451 Richmond, VA 804-261-1044
    Honolulu, HI 808-521-1411 Sacramento, CA 916-481-9110
    Houston, TX 713-868-2266 St. Louis, MO 314-241-5357
    Indianapolis, IN 317-639-3301 Salt Lake City, UT 801-579-1400
    Jackson, MS 601-948-5000 San Antonio, TX 210-225-6741
    Jacksonville, FL 904-721-1211 San Diego, CA 619-565-1255
    Kansas City, MO 816-221-6100 San Francisco, CA 415-553-7400
    Knoxville, TN 423-544-0751 San Juan, PR 809-754-6000
    Las Vegas, NV 702-385-1281 Seattle, WA 206-622-0460
    Little Rock, AR 501-221-9100 Springfield, IL 217-522-9675
    Los Angeles, CA 310-477-6565 Tampa, FL 813-273-4566
    Louisville, KY 502-583-3941 Washington Metro, DC 202-252-7801


    http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/gen_pub/cfassmnt.htm

    This was last updated on August 25, 1998

    "If cowardly and dishonorable men sometimes shoot unarmed men with army pistols or guns, the evil must be prevented by the penitentiary and gallows, and not by a general deprivation of a constitutional privilege." - Arkansas Supreme Court, 1878
  • gunpaqgunpaq Member Posts: 4,607 ✭✭
    edited November -1
    What a post. After reading all of it I don't have anything to reply now.

    Pack slow, fall stable, pull high, hit dead center.
  • interstatepawnllcinterstatepawnllc Member Posts: 9,390
    edited November -1
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