.

Captured weapons?

ManygunsManyguns Member Posts: 3,837
edited January 2015 in US Military Veteran Forum
Maybe it's been asked before, but what kind of small arms did you guys mostly capture? I have a couple of "bring backs" a Chinese SKS and a Mosin Nagant. What other stuff did you find? Any French weapons? What usually happened to the captured stuff? Was it destroyed? Was it hard to get something to bring back when you left?
Thanks, Tom

Comments

  • River RatRiver Rat Member Posts: 9,022
    edited November -1
    Anything we came back from patrol with was turned over to the armorers, and included in the incident report, contact report, or whatever it was called at the moment. I suppose these were either warehoused or destroyed, since the ARVNs were supplied with U.S. arms. I never asked. I'm sure anything really nice was retained by our guys in the armory.

    You could get just about anything on the black market. The Makarov copies were kinda cool. I never saw anything French, but then I was there towards the end of the game.

    While we respected the AK and the RPG (or the B-40), in general we had a disdain for any Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese made weapons. They were very coarsely manufactured, and we had a lot of cool old WWII U.S. stuff to use. That, plus a reluctance to have their sound signature traced to us, kept us from any interest in using them. We were glad to see them disappear. (Note: by the time I was there, the early problems with the M16 had pretty much been resolved. I'd bet some GIs in the mid-60s would have happily dropped their shiny new 16 and picked up a reliable Kalashnikov).

    As for bringing them back to the U.S., looking back I guess I might have been able to get away with it. I went from the Delta to DaNang by helicopter, then boarded the mail plane to my carrier in the South China Sea. It might have been easy enough to sneak a Makarov or SKS into my duffel, and then hide it away on the ship. Nobody looked into my bag. If I had sneaked something, of course, they would have searched me -- and I'd probably still be breaking rocks at Sing Sing today.

    As for LEGALLY bringing in a firearm, I have no idea if there was a procedure. Never thought to ask. I've heard a lot of folks say you had to leave them there.
  • 1935Lee1935Lee Member Posts: 61 ✭✭
    edited November -1
    in general we had a disdain for any Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese made weapons.
    I traded for a ak47 in 1966 and carried it on patrol for the next six months.
    It would empty a mag every time you got down on the trigger, our M16s was a POS. the ak47 was cheaply made but it worked
  • River RatRiver Rat Member Posts: 9,022
    edited November -1
    quote:Originally posted by 1935Lee
    in general we had a disdain for any Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese made weapons.
    I traded for a ak47 in 1966 and carried it on patrol for the next six months.
    It would empty a mag every time you got down on the trigger, our M16s was a POS. the ak47 was cheaply made but it worked


    Lee, I share your respect for the AK. But when I got there in 1972 the problems with the M-16 were ironed out. Besides, I sat behind a pair of M-2s. [;)]
  • Laredo LeftyLaredo Lefty Member Posts: 13,437 ✭✭✭
    edited November -1
    We captured all sorts of weapons, mostly AKs & SKSs. We were not allowed to bring back AKs due to their machinegun classification, SKSs and bolt actions were OK.
  • CapnMidnightCapnMidnight Member Posts: 8,520
    edited November -1
    Sold AKs to Air Force guys for beer & boom boom money.
    W.D.
  • Smoky14Smoky14 Member Posts: 503 ✭✭
    edited November -1
    quote:Originally posted by CapnMidnight
    Sold AKs to Air Force guys for beer & boom boom money.
    W.D.

    And we smuggled them home in the lining of our mini-fridge.
    That boom boom would get you in trouble [}:)]
  • lee shermanlee sherman Member Posts: 405 ✭✭✭
    edited November -1
    A close friend sent home a Colt 1911 A1 in pieces, one piece at a time. Stamped U.S. property. Serial was 1943 ish. Plenty of holster wear but way cool anyway. A serious bust if caught. He still has it. [8D]
  • v35v35 Member Posts: 13,200
    edited November -1
    I was in Korea and visited a warehouse where all serviceable captured
    small arms and ammunition were stacked and stored.
    Even the Moisin Nagant rifles were kept.
    They were to be reissued to "Friendly" insurgents in other countries
    where we didn't want our signature on them.
    That's why very few captured weapons could legally be sent or taken home.
    This policy may well have also applied to ordnance captured in Vietnam. There were many kinds of US and foreign pistols floating around as well as submachineguns and light machineguns. I had a water cooled Maxim on carriage and a BRNO 8mm LMG. The list of what you could register and send or take home was small. You could only take one approved pistol home. I sold my Remington 51 I brought over and took home a Colt NS 455 that I converted to 30 Carbine. It was novel but not strong enough & a dumb move as I could have taken home a fine Luger that was no big deal then. The Rem'51 gave me confidence in a few situations. It never left my body even in the sleeping bag.
    My unit had wooden crates, steel strapping equipment and stencils so official looking crates got through. Unfortunately, my stuff has long since been traded off. Of that stuff,I regret most a primo North Korean PPSH41 with tools and sling is gone. Then there were some T3 Carbine & A4 receivers & M81 scopes that were no big deal when traded off in the '50s but are valuable today. My predecessor never forgave me for not shipping him a captured '28A1 he dismantled for that purpose and an intact PPSH41 drum which were rare as hen's teeth since the enemy mostly used stick mags but my orders home gave a day's notice. The joy of leaving that hell hole overcame any thoughts of sending home more good stuff.
  • nickeymnickeym Member Posts: 2 ✭✭
    edited November -1
    I wished I knew what happened to my US army colt 45 with the carved ( real ) ivory grips I had while in country that a guy borrowed and then went home with or tried to get it back to the states .
    I was going to try to get it home. It would be worth a few thousand now.
    Nha Be 67-68
  • john6012john6012 Member Posts: 97 ✭✭
    edited November -1
    You can bet the VC took weapons home with them.
  • MIKE WISKEYMIKE WISKEY Member Posts: 9,255 ✭✭✭
    edited November -1
    I was at the 'end of the road' for captured weapons. C.C.& S. company at Long Bin (collection, clasification & salvage). For non U.S. issued weapons we would turn useable ak's ect over to the Vietnames;, sks's, mausers, ect would be either distroyed or given to 'short timers'.

    "I saw just about every weapon made since WW I in there caches and hands!"...............We had some that went back to the Spanish/American war!
  • Jim RauJim Rau Member Posts: 3,550
    edited November -1
    I saw just about every weapon made since WW I in there caches and hands!
  • poppaleepoppalee Member Posts: 1,239 ✭✭✭✭✭
    edited November -1
    I was wounded and they even took my personal items from my bag. I got back with less than I took. Some of the stuff I know the guys could use and I would have given, but not all.
  • StingSting Member Posts: 629 ✭✭✭✭
    edited November -1
    Me too. Evacuated out and my binoculars never got back home, but I knew that another Marine would love them.
  • 11echo11echo Member Posts: 1,001 ✭✭✭✭
    edited November -1
    I've got a question for those who indicated they or other in their unit used captured AK's on regular patrols. When I was in, late in the Nam war, I was stationed in Germany, but was curious about operations in that theater. I had asked my Platoon Sgt about this very subject, he had indicated that NO they did not use captured weaponry for regular patrolling! Because the AK make a distinctive bark and also of times GI's would fire at that noise! Made since to me at the time, but after hearing these stories I'm wondering how ridged was the "rule" not too?
  • ChuckWBIVChuckWBIV Member Posts: 351 ✭✭✭
    edited November -1
    How 'bout an NVA 12.7mm (dad, not me):

    Screenshot-4.png

    Dad (CO & XO of 3 A-Camps) is far left here, 10 November 1966, same morning he was hit in the foot.

    cPicture.jpg

    He is not mentioned by name in this After Action report, although he IS mentioned in reference 'a', the Marshall book.

    Note also the name of the 4rth Mike Force unit CO - Irzyk; pic below is dad trading bronze oak leaves in, for silver oak leaves, from Irzyk's dad in '70, while dad was with 10th SFG @ Devens.

    quote:?_oTASK FORCE PRONG?__
    8-12 November 1966
    REFERENCES:
    a. West to Cambodia by S.L.A. Marshall.
    b. Green Berets At War by Shelby L. Stanton.
    c. Silent Birdmen by Albert Rampone.

    BACKGROUND:

    a. During the period in question, the II Corps MIKE FORCE consisted of three
    U.S. Army Special Forces ?_oA?__ Detachments ?_" A-217, A-218 and A-219. Subsequently, at a later point in time, additional ?_oA?__ Detachments and personnel were assigned and the II Corps MIKE FORCE was then officially designated a ?_oB?__ Detachment, (B-20). In addition, the fighting force at this point in time consisted of approximately 1000+ Montagnards, mainly of the Jarai and Rhade tribes. Also included were a ?_osprinkling?__ of Koho, Sedang and a few other tribes from the Central Highlands. These indigenous personnel were led and commanded by the U.S. Army Special Forces personnel of the aforementioned ?_oA?__ Detachments. There were no Vietnamese LLDB Special Forces personnel assigned during my tenure as the Commander of the II Corps MIKE FORCE..

    b. The purpose of this narrative is an attempt by the undersigned and the other four surviving participants in recreating the circumstances surrounding the participation of the 3d MIKE FORCE Company, II Corps MIKE FORCE relative to their actions that occurred as part of a joint operation involving elements of the United States Army Fourth Infantry Division during the period 8-12 November 1966 near the Cambodian Border in and around the Northern Plei Trap Valley in South Vietnam.

    c. On or about 6 November 1966 I was directed to report to Lieutenant Colonel
    Eleazer ?_oLee?__ Parmly IV, Commander, ?_oB?__ Company, 5th Special Forces Group, (Airborne) located in Pleiku, South Vietnam. Upon arrival at his office, Colonel Parmly directed me to prepare and provide a MIKE FORCE Company to participate in a joint operation commencing on 8 November in concert with two other CIDG companies that would be provided by the Plei Djereng and Duc Co ?_oA?__ Camps. The CIDG forces while operating independently from each other within designated area of operations would primarily be a screening force for elements of the U.S. Army 4th Infantry Division that would be conducting a series of Search and Destroy Operations north of Plei Djereng and west of the Nam Sathay River toward the Tri-Border Area, (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos)..

    d. I selected the 3d MIKE FORCE Company commanded by lst Lieutenant
    Robert C. Jacobelly to represent the II Corps MIKE FORCE on this operation. The lst MIKE FORCE Company was commanded by lst Lt Larry Dring. Larry had recently taken command from lst Lt Neal Y. Pickett, due to rotate to CONUS and his company had been designated the Reserve MIKE FORCE element, prepared to react to any contingency in the II Corps area as directed by Colonel Parmly or Colonel Francis Kelly, CO, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in Nha Trang.
    -1-
    Additionally, the 2d MIKE FORCE Company, normally under the command of lst Lt. Gilbert Jenkins was due to return to Pleiku and ?_ostand-down?__ on 9 November following their participation in Operation BLACKJACK 21, (Mobile Guerrilla Force 777) during the period 9 Oct. ?_" 9 Nov. ?_T66. Ironically they operated in generally the same AO that the 3d MF Company would be committed to on 8 November. During BJ21, the 2d MIKE FORCE Company conducted operations under the command of Captain James Fenlon, who had been assigned for this new and innovative operation by Colonel Kelly over my personal objections. The 4th MIKE FORCE Company under the command of lst Lt Andrew Irzyk was undergoing recruitment, organization, and training and was not as yet considered ?_ocombat-ready?__.

    SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS:

    a. On the morning of 8 November 1966 the 3d MIKE FORCE Company
    consisting of a Reconnaissance Platoon and four Rifle Platoons airlifted from the II Corps MIKE FORCE base area in Pleiku to LZ Lane near the Cambodian Border which had been secured by a company from the 4th U.S. Infantry Division. U.S. Army Special Forces personnel assigned to the 3d MIKE FORCE Company in addition to Lieutenant Jacabelly were Sergeants First Class Frank Huff and Robert Ramsey and Sergeant Danny Panfil. Tactical circumstances dictated that the MIKE FORCE element would be operating further north and some distance away from the other two CIDG companies. During my mission briefing Colonel Parmly recommended that I consider adding a few more U.S. personnel to this particular operation. I decided that I, along with my Sergeant Major (MSG Frank Quinn) would deploy with the 3d Company. For all practical purposes we would be considered ?_ostrap hangers?__ on this operation and try to assist where required. The UH1D Helicopter airlift of the MIKE FORCE element to LZ Lane was conducted in multiple staggered lifts due to the extreme heat conditions obtaining during this period in Vietnam and exacerbated by the paucity of available helicopters. The end result caused an approximate three hour delay in the planned commencement of the operation.

    b. Shortly thereafter the MF moved out - initially in a northeasterly direction.
    Approximately one-half hour after movement, the point element burst upon a NVA Anti-Aircraft Battery equipped with 12.7 mm (.51 Cal.) AA Guns in the act of emplacing their guns. It was a total surprise. I do not believe the enemy had any idea that the MF was in their midst and they panicked. In all probability they were intending to play havoc with the various U.S. Army helicopters transporting the remainder of the 4th Infantry Division units and the other CIDG TF Prong elements. The MF point immediately opened fire on the enemy. ?_oJake?__ Jacobelly and I rushed to the front of the column ?_" just in time for ?_oJake?__ to sustain a superficial wound to his forearm. As a result ?_oJake?__ became the initial friendly casualty on this mission. The NVA on the other hand suffered a number of casualties. This was quite obvious from the ?_oblood trails?__ along their retreat march . Interestingly, Danny Panfil killed one of the largest NVA soldiers I had seen to that time in Vietnam. Although the NVA soldier did not have any rank or insignia on his uniform,
    -2-
    or carry any other type of identification, I will always believe that he may have easily been a Chinese Artillery Advisor. We?_Tll never know. The result of this encounter secured the capture of 35 NVA field packs and parts of seven 12.7 mm AA Guns, along with a substantial amount of 12.7 mm ammo. ?_oJake?__ collected the NVA packs and had them moved back to LZ Lane for subsequent evacuation to Pleiku and evaluation for any possible intelligence information by the 4th Division G2 folks. ?_oJake?__ elected to keep the 12.7 mm AA weapons with the unit inasmuch as the Montagnards would receive a ?_obounty?__ from 5th SFG(A) for each enemy weapon captured in combat following their return to Pleiku. This decision not to immediately evacuate the weapons along with the packs proved to be unwise inasmuch as the weapons rapidly became too much of a burden for the troops to carry in addition to their own weapons, ammo and personal gear.
    However, at the time the decision was made it was done so based on the fact that all of the air assets belonged to the 4th Infantry Division and no one could be assured that in fact the weapons would be taken to the MF compound for safe keeping. It was shortly after moving out that I noticed a number of weapons parts and cans of ammunition scattered along and slightly off the trail. It became readily apparent that the troops were discarding the weapons parts rather than carry them. As a result, I suggested to ?_oJake?__ that he should collect the remaining captured weapons and ammo consisting of three
    complete 12.7 mm weapon assemblies and parts of four others.

    A radio message was initiated to ?_oB?__ Company, 5th SFG(A) requesting a helicopter be dispatched on the afternoon of 9 November to a clearing located along our planned route of march that would serve as a suitable LZ for the purpose of evacuating the captured weapons and ammo back to Pleiku. (See Note below).

    It was shortly thereafter that the 3d MF Company discovered a recently abandoned Regimental size NVA bivouac area constructed mainly with bamboo hidden under a heavy jungle canopy. This facility had raised sleeping platforms, kitchen areas, and training facilities to include a small firing range area. ?_oJake?__ elected to utilize the protective site as a bivouac site for his unit on the evening of 8 November and then destroy as much of the facility as possible before moving out the next day.

    *NOTE: Following the return of the 3d MF Company to Pleiku it was decided to present Colonel Francis Kelly, CO, 5th SFG(A) with one of the captured 12.7 mm AA guns. He accepted the weapon on behalf of the II Corps MF and it remained on display in front of 5th SFG(A) Headquarters until Colonel Mike Healy, the last Commander of the 5th SFG(A) in Vietnam relocated the colors of the 5th SFG(A) back to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Along with the colors came that 12.7 mm AA gun. Today, that captured NVA 12.7 mm AA weapon is prominently displayed on an outside corner of the JFK Special Warfare Museum. A fitting memorial tribute to the men of the II Corps MIKE FORCE.

    c. On the early morning of 9 November the 3d MF Company continued their
    route of march in a north-northwesterly direction along a newly discovered trail that was wide enough to sustain vehicular traffic. I in turn, moved with a platoon size carrying

    -3
    party to the previously selected LZ for the purpose of extracting the captured weapons back to Pleiku. This task was accomplished without incident. I then moved to link up with the 3d MF Company. ?_oJake?__ deployed his recon element well out in front of the main company force and had excellent flank security. Initially the terrain in this area was extremely wide open reflecting a paucity of normal jungle foliage. Many large trees abounded in the area. However, around noon the MF found itself moving into a triple canopy jungle. ?_oJake?__ was unsure of his exact position and decided to move to a more prominent position in order to reestablish his exact position. ?_oJake?__, Frank Huff and Bob Ramsey moved out with a platoon size element. They established a perimeter that straddled a trail on the crest of a small hill. As ?_oJake?__ was conducting a map reconnaissance to determine his location, the point security element notified him that there were some NVA moving toward the MF platoon along the small trail to the north of the MF position. The entire MF platoon was alerted and remained absolutely silent. The NVA patrol continued to move down the trail toward the MF platoon and as they reached a fallen tree that laid across a small creek the northern security element engaged them with devastating small arms fire. The NVA patrol never had a chance to return fire. They were eliminated almost immediately. ?_oJake?__ and the MF platoon moved throughout the area checking for enemy casualties. They noted that at least one NVA soldier had escaped and had moved off up the trail. This soldier was discovered dead approximately 50 meters north of the engagement site as a result of being shot through the armpit that apparently severed a main artery. ?_oJake?__ and his men collected what equipment and materials that were determined significant and moved to rejoin the main body of the 3d MF Company. The action resulted in ten NVA personnel KIA and no friendly casualties. At approximately the same time as ?_oJake?__ and his platoon linked up with the 3d MF Company I, and the platoon with me linked up. Interestingly, at the same time numerous sightings of small NVA elements occurred from time to time during this entire day?_Ts movement. There was little attempt on the part of the enemy to engage the MF, although the MF did attempt to pursue and engage these very small squad level enemy forces, but they easily evaded. It became readily apparent that they knew the terrain well. Somewhere along the planned route of march (after all of these years, I cannot recall) ?_oJake?__ elected to establish a perimeter to RON for the evening. (See Note below).

    *NOTE: It was later determined from documents discovered following the battle between the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division and elements of the NVA 88TH Regiment that all contacts with the Montagnard force were to be avoided until the American battalion had been engaged and eliminated. Apparently, the NVA knew from their own undercover intelligence sources within the South Vietnamese military that the 4th Division would be operating in this particular AO and they planned to destroy them first and us later. As it turned out a large element of the 88TH NVA Regiment did in fact attack LTC J. ?_oDick?__ Lay and his battalion very late on the evening of 10 November and that battle continued well in to the next day. According to these same captured documents, the Commander of the 88th NVA Regiment had also designated a Battalion+ size force to attack and destroy the American led indigenous force on the morning of 11 November.
    -4-
    d. On the early morning of 10 November the 3d MF Company continued
    to move in a westerly direction toward the Cambodian border. Approximately two hours into the march the ?_oPoint?__ element heard voices to their front. The signal was passed and the entire unit deployed for contact. Six NVA, lightly armed with only hand grenades and knives were observed moving toward the 3d MF reconnaissance platoon. The NVA were challenged to surrender but, elected to run. The troops opened fire killing three and wounding one who continued to evade down the trail. Two were captured. ?_oJake?__ and I aided by a few CIDG soldiers continued down the trail to catch the one lone wounded soldier by following his ?_oblood trail?__. We came upon him sitting up against the trunk of a tree. As I approached him, ?_oJake?__ yelled out, ?_oSir, watch it, he has a grenade?__. The wounded NVA soldier was in the process of pulling the string on a ?_oPotato Masher?__ type grenade and handing it to me as I attempted to bend over and provide medical assistance to him. Needless to say, I wore out the knees of my ?_otiger fatigues?__ clearing the area. The troops in the vicinity all opened fire on the NVA and killed him.

    Following this incident, the 3d MF Company moved westward to the eastern edge of what became commonly known as the ?_oPali Wali Dry Lake Bed?__. A map review reflected a boundary line designating the center of this dry lake area as the border boundary marker separating South Vietnam and Cambodia. ?_oJake?__ elected to
    establish his RON perimeter on the eastern edge of the dry lake bed. Later he would direct that a platoon size outpost be established approximately 200 meters out beyond the main body on the northern most western edge of the dry lake bed. This was decided due to the earlier enemy sightings and would turn out to be a fortuitous decision.

    I elected to return to Pleiku with the two NVA POW?_Ts and requested a helicopter
    extraction.

    While elements of the MF Company were checking out the eastern edge of the dry lake bed, Bob Ramsey, Frank Huff and their platoon reconnoitered the entire western edge of the area along the Cambodian side. They discovered a number of well used trails. During their reconnaissance, they recalled seeing glimpses of NVA elements apparently just observing the company?_Ts actions in the area. Bob reported this finding to ?_oJake?__ and remembered ?_oJake?__ commenting at the time that everyone had better ?_oremain alert and be on their toes?__, as there was no doubt in his mind that the NVA were up to something. To further confuse/deceive the NVA as to his actual defensive positions ?_oJake?__ decided to wait until darkness before he physically established the company defensive perimeter. As soon as it commenced to get dark ?_oJake?__ directed Bob and Frank to cross the dry lake bed and establish a platoon size outpost near the northwest corner of the area where a number of trails intersected. Interestingly they had moved to their newly assigned ambush position prior to ?_oJake?__ establishing the main company defensive position. Although in radio communications and generally aware of where the company was physically located they were not exactly sure as to configuration of the defensive perimeter. For his part, Bob established an ?_oegg shaped?__ perimeter over the trail intersection. Actually, Bob had reported that the main trail coming in from Cambodia was more of a road than a trail. Claymores were distributed and emplaced to cover the
    -5-
    most likely avenues of approach to the platoon position. Bob and Frank briefed the ?_oyards?__ as to the signal and route they were to take, if in fact it became necessary to fall back and rejoin the main element. The physical signal would be a hand-held fired flare combined with a series of verbal commands. Everyone was directed to remain alert and prepared to pull back at a moments notice. In other words, ?_odon?_Tt get too comfortable?__. As a result, the troops remained on 100% ?_oready alert?__ throughout the night. Bob later reported being edgy and he remained awake all night with his back up against a tree trunk. Prior to securing for the night, ?_oJake?__ made contact with the supporting 175mm Artillery unit and was informed that the MF position was outside the range of their field artillery guns. As a result ?_oJake?__ was unable to plan for any supporting artillery fires in the event of enemy contact. For the most part the night was uneventful. Nothing out of the ordinary or unusual was heard or observed. Then dawn broke.

    As daylight, approximately 0600 hours became more in focus, the ?_oyards?__ on the left side of the ambush position facing the road leading from Cambodia suddenly became very excited. Bob moved to where he could observe more clearly and noticed a NVA column moving in his direction. It was about this time that the ?_oyards?__ opened fire and engaged the enemy troops. It appeared that the forward element initially scattered by pulling back and out of sight. Frank Huff immediately contacted ?_oJake?__ and requested artillery support. ?_oJake?__ informed Frank that the MF was out of range and that there would be no artillery support. Bob later stated that he was convinced then and remains convinced to this day that the NVA were totally surprised. They were not aware, nor were they prepared for meeting an enemy force in a prepared defensive position on the western side of the dry lake bed. * The initiated fire action by the platoon appeared to catch them off guard. After all, they probably believed that in view of the fact that this side of the dry lake bed was in Cambodia, therefore, no enemy would dare occupy that particular piece of terrain. The armament of the NVA force appeared to be that of a Heavy Weapons unit that was probably intended to provide supporting fires for the main attack on the MF company. Within minutes the NVA deployed and commenced to attack the outpost. Bob had already informed ?_oJake?__ of the actions that were taking place. In view of the fact that there was no artillery support available and the action that was beginning to develop at the front edge of the main company position, ?_oJake?__ directed that the platoon rejoin the main element. The fire on both sides became very intense. As soon as the NVA reached the proximity of the platoon claymores Bob directed that all claymores be fired. This action caused an immediate slow-down in the NVA attack. At the same time he immediately fired the flare signal that directed everyone to fall back to the MF company perimeter. For some unknown reason the firing of that friendly flare apparently caused the NVA to cease their attack and pull back. It was believed that in view of the fact that the NVA had been previously known to routinely utilize various colored flares in their attacks against enemy forces that the signal fired by Bob coincided with a similar signal that the NVA had planned during this attack. The NVA troops apparently reacted to the signal believing the flare had been fired by their commander. (In all of the confusion of
    battle it is possible that two signal flares were fired, one by us and one by the NVA). As a result, at least for the moment, a welcomed halt to the enemy attack occurred. It appears

    -6-
    now that this ironic happenstance would be one of those coincidental occurrences of
    combat. It would not be the last during the course of this engagement. Bob and Frank had earlier witnessed the NVA firing various flare signals during the attack on their position. Interestingly, several enemy flare pistols were recovered in the vicinity following the battle.

    Bob urged his troops to move rapidly across the dry lake bed toward friendly lines. He elected to bring up the rear during the crossing to ensure that the entire platoon had cleared the previously held outpost position. One of the ?_oyards?__ near him was hit in the leg, but managed to continue to make his way across to the eastern edge of the lake bed.. It was during this moment that intermittent rifle fire erupted in the area of the abandoned outpost followed by the sound of small caliber mortars being fired from somewhere in the near vicinity. Where the mortar rounds were impacting was unknown at the time. Bob fired his M-16 in the general direction and all at once rounds were impacting in and around his own position. In the confusion of the battle area the NVA appeared to be everywhere. An enemy rocket ricocheted into a tree trunk near his position causing Bob to be slammed into the ground. The NVA that he observed in his vicinity were not in large numbers or in a particular combat formation. Bob assumed them to be skirmishers. During this entire time Bob believed that the main element of the company appeared to also be heavily engaged as firing seemed to be increasing in and around the southeastern edge of the company perimeter. During the friendly force crossover, ?_oJake?__ and his interpreter moved into the dry lake bed and provided limited small arms fire support for the friendly element to move back to the main body. This support was probably not very effective except that it did provide some return fire to protect the movement of the MF security element and cause the NVA to keep down. As the security element moved across the dry lake bed Bob had become separated from the ?_oyards?__ and Frank Huff. He was not exactly sure where the leading edge of the company perimeter was located. He continued heading south along the eastern edge of the dry lake bed. Bob later reported that he should have been more worried about being shot by friendly forces, but at the moment it just didn?_Tt cross his mind. He stumbled across several dead NVA and a wounded NVA who was unarmed and crawling along. He delayed along the way to secure a Russian compass off the neck of one of the dead NVA. Bob has retained that unique combat souvenir to this day. Further in from the edge of the dry lake bed Bob came across a couple of dead ?_oyards?__.

    *NOTE: The fact that Frank and Bob were able to ambush this point element apparently caused the NVA Battalion Commander to commence his overall attack prematurely. Additionally, it was later determined that there were no friendly casualties during the crossover back to the main MF perimeter. There was however, one .30 caliber machine gun that had been dropped and remained abandoned throughout the battle on the dry lake bed. ?_oJake?__ upon learning of the missing weapon decided that it was far more dangerous to attempt to recover it.



    -7-
    About this point in time, ?_oJake?__ had moved toward the edge of the dry lake bed and with the assistance of a ?_oyard?__ grenadier began firing a M79 Grenade Launcher toward the suspected enemy mortar positions. They fired every round that was available, probably two dozen or more. The enemy mortar was silenced. ?_oJake?__ recalled that he had been bedded down behind a log that eventually became the site of the initial CP. He had awaken prior to the action on the far side of the dry lake bed and was in the process of establishing radio contact with Pleiku when the ambush was initiated by the security element across the dry lake bed. Fortunately he was in voice contact with the ?_odawn patrol?__ FAC. ?_oJake?__ requested immediate assistance. The 01 ?_oBird-Dog?__ aircraft had the usual wing mounted rockets, but ?_oJake?__ did not recall seeing him fire them. The
    FAC buzzed the far perimeter and ?_oJake?__ advised him to ?_obe careful?__, the NVA were directing small arms fire toward his aircraft. The FAC responded that he was fine and
    that he would provide what support he could until the fighter aircraft arrived. The first fighters on scene were A1E Skyraider aircraft who provided suppressing fire support with 20mm guns, some rockets and various size bombs including CBU?_Ts and Napalm. Notably the A1E aircraft had plenty of ?_ostaying time?__ on station. The FAC having determined the exact location of the MF was able to direct the fires of the A1E aircraft with some degree of accuracy and efficiency. However, with the arrival of the ?_oFast Movers?__ (jet aircraft) the MF experienced difficulty with the Close Air Support (CAS) assets identifying the exact limits of the MF perimeter due to the high jungle canopy. The 3d MF Company had previously been hit by three mass waves of NVA troops and fortunately repelled all of them. * As a result the FAC requested that the MF mark the forward edge of their position with smoke in order that he could utilize that smoke as a marker for the ?_oFast Movers?__. ?_oJake?__ elected to move to the forward edge of the perimeter with his interpreter ?_oJohnny?__ in order to throw the requested smoke grenades out to where the FAC and CAS pilots could see and identify them. As they moved forward they were able to observe many NVA moving around the battlefield. They elected not to engage them prior to ?_othrowing?__ the smoke grenades. Initially they were not seen, but as soon as ?_oJake?__ and Johnny had thrown the red smoke grenades they were taken under fire. It was during this movement that ?_oJake?__ was severely wounded, however, he remained conscious. He later recounted that being shot in the gut felt like ?_oMickey Mantle had hit him with his best swing?__. As he laid on the ground he was able to ascertain that he could not move his legs. He opened his fatigue shirt and saw a small hole in his gut. To his surprise he was not bleeding profusely externally. He had the presence of mind to immediately direct ?__Johnny?__ (who ironically had also been shot in the hand) to seek assistance from one of the Americans. ?_oJake?__ later commented that he was unaware as to just how long he had laid out in the open before Danny Panfil arrived. Meanwhile Bob, in the vicinity heard Danny yelling for him to come and assist in moving ?_oJake?__ to safety. Bob and Danny grabbed ?_oJake?__ and commenced to drag him as fast as they could toward friendly positions and cover. Fortunately ?_oJake?__, although semi-conscious didn?_Tt appear to be suffering any further pain as the two men struggled to move his ?_odead weight?__ along the uneven ground. ?_oJake?__ later commented on the fact that while they were dragging him to safety, his damn fatigue trousers started to come off. In all probability it was fortunate for ?_oJake?__ that Bob had been delayed in his withdrawal

    -8-
    because ?_oJake?__ and Danny were out in ?_ono man?_Ts land?__. Danny was not considered by
    any means to be a large individual. He was experiencing problems in manhandling ?_oJake?__ by himself and at the same time defend against enemy combatants in the vicinity. It was about this same time that the NVA commenced to fire a barrage of rockets toward the company perimeter. The volume of small arms fire also increased, especially in the direction of Bob and Danny as they were moving ?_oJake?__ to safety. Once they reached the CP location, Danny administered medical attention to ?_oJake?__ and then wrapped him in a poncho. During this entire period Frank Huff was maintaining radio communications with supporting friendly air assets. The troops on the ground were a bit concerned as some of the suppressing 20mm fires and bombs were considered ?_odangerously close?__. Everyone recalled vividly the trees and debris flying everywhere and the sounds of all of the explosions.

    *NOTE: ?_oJake?__ recalled later that either Bob or Danny had informed him that in front of the one remaining .30 caliber machine-gun position there were 30 plus dead NVA soldiers stacked less than 10 meters to the front of that position. The ?_oyards?__ manning that gun had accomplished an amazing task of keeping the enemy at bay and in all probability assisted greatly in saving the day for the entire 3d MF company.

    About this same time the helicopter carrying Clyde and a few re-supply items was observed approaching the area. The chopper passed directly over the current besieged company position. It was on a direct path to the last position that Clyde had taken off from the day before. Everyone within the perimeter could see and hear the heavy caliber rounds striking the helicopter. All at once from a height of approximately 12 feet Clyde was observed jumping from the left door of the helicopter, pass under it, appear to retrieve something that had fallen from the right side of the helicopter and while firing his
    M-16 rush toward the eastern edge of the jungle. Bob remembered Danny saying, ?_opoop, he ran the wrong way?__. Simultaneously, someone yelled at Bob and Danny to move to
    some logs nearby. Soon after reaching that covered position Danny commenced applying much needed medical assistance to ?_oJake?__. Bob recalled observing that Frank was on the radio attempting to secure additional close air support. Frank had sustained a superficial wound as a result of some flying shrapnel as it bounced off his foot. It was still hot as he attempted to pick it up. After applying medical aid attention to ?_oJake?__, Danny and Frank Quinn elected to leave the relative safety of the perimeter and attempt to locate Clyde. While they were gone the NVA continued to probe the entire perimeter. Ammunition was running low and the troops had taken to throwing all of the grenades they could secure from friendly wounded and KIA. Enemy dead were lying all around the perimeter. Some were located as close as the opposite side of the very same logs that provided cover to ?_oJake?__, Bob and Frank Huff. Shortly thereafter, Frank Quinn and Danny returned with Clyde. Clyde assumed command and directed the defense of the small perimeter. Finally, the NVA appeared to have had enough. Although the NVA continued to snipe at the perimeter from a distance they did not follow up with a further mass attack. Apparently the close air strikes provided by fixed wing aircraft and helicopter gun-ships exacted a terrible toll on the enemy force.

    -9-
    e. CLYDE RETURNS TO THE FIELD:

    On the early morning of 11 November someone, (I cannot recall who) rushed
    in to my ?_ohootch?__ and informed me that ?_oJake?__ and the 3d MF Company had been hit and hit hard by a large force of NVA. I immediately rushed over to the ?_oB?__ Company CP and requested a ?_ochopper?__ to return to the field. Fortunately, Major Al Cartwright, a senior pilot from the 281st Army Helicopter Company in support of the 5th SFG(A) and further assigned to support ?_oB?__ Company, 5th SFG(A) was on the helio-pad. He stated that he was willing to take me and as much ammunition as possible to the besieged MIKE FORCE Company. During the hurried loading of the chopper, lst Lt. Paul Hess, assigned to ?_oB?__ Company, 5th SFG(A) as an Assistant S4 requested permission to accompany the flight. I agreed and he assumed a position next to Sergeant Hank Leonard in the right side gun seat section of the chopper. I briefed Major Cartwright as to the location where I had been lifted out of the dry lake bed on the afternoon of 10 November. As we approached the same northeastern dry lake area that I had departed on 10 November Major Cartwright contacted the 3d MF on the ground and requested that they ?_opop smoke?__. The 3d MF ?_opopped?__ ?_oyellow smoke?__. Yellow Smoke was identified and acknowledged by Major Cartwright. However, unknown to either Major Cartwright or myself, the 3d MF Company during the course of the battle had been pushed back toward the southern portion of the dry lake due to continued assaults by the NVA. As a result, Al Cartwright had over flown the 3d MF Company. Ironically this is where the second ?_ohappenstance?__ of this battle occurred. The NVA had also popped ?_oyellow smoke?__. Inasmuch as the 3d MF Company did not have visual contact with the NVA element that had popped the ?_oyellow smoke?__, they therefore could not warn us in time to the fact that we had already passed their perimeter location and were flying into danger. Just as the chopper was preparing to hover in the vicinity of the area where I had lifted off the day before, all hell broke loose. The helicopter was riddled by heavy machine gun fire. * Unbeknownst to me at that moment, both Hess and Leonard were killed immediately. The co-pilot was wounded and I believe the door gunner on the left side of the helicopter was also slightly wounded. The chopper was shaking terribly and obviously was in danger of crashing. Major Cartwright yelled to me that our only chance of surviving was to ?_olighten up?__. I took that to mean ?_" ?_oget out before we crash?__. I jumped out and crossed under the chopper. It was at that moment that Hess?_T M-16 with three magazines taped together fell on the ground next to me. I picked it up and started running toward the tree line. About that time, a number of NVA moved out of the tree line toward me. All that went through my mind at that moment was ?_oOops, wrong uniforms?__. I immediately hit the prone position and began to engage the NVA with rifle fire. A NVA soldier threw a grenade which impacted approximately fifteen feet in front of me causing a number of small fragments to penetrate my legs and left side above my heart. I was not seriously wounded, but, scared enough to ?_opiss in my pants?__. I laid there, feigning death. I do not recall exactly how long I laid there not moving, but it seemed a very long time. Shortly thereafter, although I was not aware of exactly how long I heard movement from my southern direction. I then heard Danny Panfil?_Ts voice before I saw him. I looked up

    -10-
    and saw Frank Quinn and Danny Panfil moving toward my location. They had engaged the NVA that had attacked me and drove them off. Upon reaching the 3d MF perimeter the first thing I ascertained was that ?_oJake?__ Jacobelly had been seriously wounded. I assumed command of the 3d MF Company and prepared for subsequent assaults.

    f. In the meantime, Major Cartwright had struggled to depart the area with his heavily damaged UH1D helicopter. He reported to Pleiku via radio the circumstances of the situation on the ground as he knew it to be at that moment. It certainly was not a rosy picture considering what had occurred with his aircraft including the KIA status of Hess and Leonard, the wounding of his co-pilot and possibly the other door gunner. One additional item he reported was that of the possible POW/MIA status of one Clyde Sincere.

    g. After reaching the 3d MF lines I quickly ascertained that the overall ammunition status within the force was in dire straight. A re-supply of ammunition was critical. I immediately dispatched a radio message to Pleiku requesting an urgent re-supply of all types of ammo. The Americans were armed with M-16?_Ts, the Montagnards were armed primarily with M1 and a few M2 Carbines, a couple BAR?_Ts, two .30 Caliber air-cooled MG?_Ts and a few M-79 Grenade Launchers. One area of concern that many of us that had served in and around the Montagnards had quickly ascertained ?_oearly in the game ?_o, was that it was difficult for the Montagnard soldier to maintain any type of real ?_ofire discipline?__. They had little problem in firing all of their ammo in one swoop unless an American was nearby, directing, observing and cautioning its expenditure. I also requested reinforcements - any and all types - U.S. and/or Indigenous. I was advised that a U.S. Company from the 4th Infantry Division would be made available soonest to reinforce us. Faint probes of the 3d MF perimeter continued throughout the day until
    shortly before 1400 hours. USAF A1-E Skyraider and various other jet aircraft continued to drop NAPALM, HE and CBU ?_obomblets?__ on the edge of the 3d MF perimeter in an
    attempt to suppress the enemy elements probing our lines. Approximately two hours following my request for a re-supply ?_" the Executive Officer, ?_oB?__ Company, 5th SFG(A) over-flew the battle area and advised us that in view of the fact that the enemy fire in the area was so intense he would not land, but, free drop the re-supply of ammo. What? Drop the re-supply! Coward. That was all that went through my mind at that moment. He proceeded to fly over us at an altitude well over 500 feet and kicked out the boxes - they landed for the most part on the western side of the dry lake bed in Cambodia. Frank Quinn and I, assisted by a few Montagnard troops made several trips across the dry lake bed under fire to retrieve as much of the precious ammo as possible. Needless to say, we had little difficulty in opening any of the boxes. Most of them had been smashed - thankfully, the majority of the ammunition survived the drop.

    h. A few hours later a number of UH1D ?_oslicks?__ from the 4th Division began
    arriving at the dry lake bed ferrying the much needed company of U.S. infantry reinforcements. There arrival permitted a consolidation of the battle area, evacuation of the many wounded including ?_oJake?__ (who by this time had been lying on the battlefield
    for almost eight hours). Not good. Also, with some difficulty we were able to evacuate
    -11-
    the Montagnard KIA and WIA. The U.S. Army pilots from the 4th Division were not as sensitive as we were as to the necessity of ensuring the return of all Montagnard KIA?_Ts to their families. The pilots initially advised me that ?_olater?__ when all else had been taken care of they would evacuate the Montagnard KIA of which there were many. I protested vigorously and to insure they would not ?_odump?__our KIA Montagnards, elected to place Frank Quinn, Frank Huff and Danny Panfil on each of the choppers carrying the Montagnard KIA and by doing so also evacuated the three of them back to Pleiku to assist in the many funerals, etc. that were soon to follow as a result of this battle. Bob Ramsey and I would remain with the ?_oB?__ Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division commanded by a young West Point Officer along with the remaining surviving members of our combat able Montagnards. The arrival of the U.S. company in the area caused the NVA to completely break contact. It appeared that the surviving enemy elements moved initially to the East toward the 88th NVA Regimental forces that were engaged against Colonel Dick Lay and his American battalion. Together the U.S. and MF companies policed the surrounding battlefield. A minimum of 58 NVA bodies were recovered and buried in one mass grave on the eastern side of the southern most edge of the dry lake bed. Exactly how many other NVA KIA were carried by their comrades to sanctuary in Cambodia will never be known, but, we were convinced there were many. In addition to numerous enemy weapons captured in and around our perimeter, two Russian made pistols were recovered, one off the body of the NVA Battalion Commander and the other off the body of his Operations Officer. I subsequently presented one to Danny Panfil for his courage under fire in assisting the many wounded and elected to keep the other for myself. Subsequently, when Colonel Parmly and I visited ?_oJake?__ Jacobelly in the hospital at Qui Nhon prior to his evacuation from Vietnam, Colonel Parmly suggested I ship the pistol to ?_oJake?__ Stateside via his Medevac kit because, as he stated, ?_oI was sure to capture many more pistols in the months to come?__. Well, so much for that idea. For the record, I never captured another Russian pistol.

    i. Sometime late on the afternoon of 11 November an order was received by the Commander, ?_oB?__ Company to commence movement easterly toward the 1st battalion perimeter currently being maintained by Colonel Lay Movement through the terrain was extremely slow because it was known that enemy elements were positioned between us and Colonel Lay. Darkness arrives early in the jungle and as it did the young First Lieutenant commanding ?_oB?__ Company received permission from Colonel Lay to RON for the evening and commence moving east again on the morning of 12 November to link up with his Battalion. The company established an elongated perimeter with the majority of the OP?_Ts and LP?_Ts primarily facing to the East for early warning of any approaching NVA. Troops were ordered to dig in. Bob Ramsey and I, along with the remaining 3d MF Company troops were located in the center of the perimeter near the U.S. Company CP. It was decided to do this to preclude any inadvertent incidents occurring between U.S. and Indigenous forces during the night in the event of a ?_ofire-fight?__ with the NVA.

    j. As evening progressed, many noises were heard emanating from the east and
    were obviously caused by the enemy forces approaching the perimeter as they retreated
    -12-
    westward toward their Cambodian sanctuary following their engagement with Colonel
    Lay?_Ts battalion. They were best heard by the Company LP?_Ts emplaced a 100 meters forward of the company perimeter. The LP?_Ts reported their information via land lines that extended back to the U.S. Company CP. The 88th NVA Regiment was in retreat from their battle with the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th U.S. Infantry Division. The retreating enemy forces fortunately passed approximately fifty meters to the left of the company perimeter that evening. No contact was established. The Company Commander had advised Colonel Lay of hearing movement to his front and had been directed by Colonel Lay not to purposely engage the enemy unless attacked due to the enemy?_Ts overwhelming strength size - i.e., remnants of a NVA Regiment versus a U.S. Company supported by a very small element of 3d MF Company survivors. The 3d MF Company had sustained well over 60% troop casualties and over 90% of their indigenous leadership either KIA or WIA on 11 November. Also, it should be noted that the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry had also suffered a number of U.S. KIA and WIA including key company level commanders in their battle with this formidable enemy foe. Later captured documents reflected that the 88th NVA Regiment had also suffered greatly as a result of their fight against the U.S. battalion and the 3d MF Company and were deemed combat ineffective for some time into the future of the war.

    k. On the morning of 12 November, the U.S. Infantry Rifle Company and the surviving members of the 3d MF Company continued to move east toward the perimeter location of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment. Link-up was established. Of note, lst Lt. Larry Dring had already airlifted his 1st MF Company into the LZ and would remain with the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment until the Operation was terminated in early December. The 3d MF Company would be airlifted to Pleiku for refitting, reconstitution, rest and recuperation from this same LZ. Thus ended the 3d MF Company?_Ts participation in TASK FORCE PRONG.

    EPILOGUE:

    * NOTE: On a sad note, this was to be Sergeant Hank Leonard?_Ts last tactical flight. Hank was due to rotate Stateside on the afternoon of 11 November 1966 having completed his tour in Vietnam. When directed, he did not hesitate to fly what turned out to be his last combat mission. Unfortunately, both he and Lieutenant Hess who had only arrived in-country three weeks earlier were KIA on that morning of 11 November 1966 while attempting to support the 3d MF Company heavily engaged against a superior and well trained NVA force.

    The aforementioned pages reflect the best possible recollections of five of the six USASF participants in the MIKE FORCE portion of Operation Task Force PRONG. I wish to express my deepest admiration and appreciation to the surviving principals, all extremely brave leaders of men during that battle on 11 November. I consider myself fortunate to call each of them ?_ofriend?__. They are, Bob Jacobelly, Frank Quinn, Bob Ramsey and Danny Panfil. ?_oJake?__. Frank, Bob and Danny, I remain so very proud of each of you. I
    -13-
    wish also to take this opportunity to remember our fallen comrade Frank Huff. Frank served with distinction during that battle, but unfortunately Frank was subsequently KIA on 9 March 1967 during BLACKJACK 23, (MGF 876). Thank you one and all for taking the time to put ?_open to paper?__. Your combined recall will insure that the best possible AAR of the 3d MIKE FORCE Company?_Ts participation during that operation and subsequent battle will remain a part of their history and the legacy of the II Corps MIKE FORCE.

    Also, there is no doubt in my mind that the many fine, super Montagnard fighters that were members of the 3d MF Company performed outstandingly under your combined leadership during that battle. Noteworthy, Kpa-Doh, Chief Interpreter, II Corps MIKE FORCE. Kpa-Doh was observed continually moving about the battlefield encouraging the ?_oyards?__, and cautioning them as it regarded ?_ofire discipline?__. It was during this time that he suffered a wound to his throat that left him permanently unable to speak above a whisper. However, and most unfortunately, a few months later I personally neglected to take into account the extremely high casualty rate among the Montagnard leadership that occurred during that battle of 11 November. That loss would greatly affect the 3d MF Company?_Ts combat effectiveness during BLACKJACK 23 in March-April 1967. But, that is another story that has to be written.

    I maintain today that the II Corps MIKE FORCE had the greatest collection of super American combat leader-soldiers ever brought together in one place. Of course, I am prejudiced, but with good reason sustained by combat with these brave men. We were fortunate to be ?_obrothers in arms?__. For myself, I was extremely pleased and proud to have had the opportunity to serve with the men of the II Corps MF. Thank you.

    Respectfully,


    CLYDE J. SINCERE, JR.
    Commander, II Corps MF
    October ?_T66 ?_" May ?_~67

    11722 Lariat Lane
    Oakton, Virginia 22124-2323
    (703) 620-0953
    [email protected]


    ROBERT C. JACOBELLY FRANCIS QUINN ROBERT RAMSEY
    [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

    DANIEL PANFIL
    [email protected]

    -14-

    SKETCH SIGNIFICANCE

    NUMBER 1 - Frank Huff and Bob Ramsey?_Ts Platoon Size Ambush Position ?_" on the night of 10 November 1966 astride the Road and Trail leading into Cambodia. At about 0530 hours, 11 November 1966 Frank and Bob initiated a surprise contact against the enemy force causing the NVA to stop in their movement to engage the main MF element and deploy earlier than desired prior to continuing their attack. Obviously, they were surprised to encounter any resistance on that side of the border. Subsequently, when the NVA launched their attack against the MF Platoon, the MF platoon fired a number of Claymores at the NVA prior to moving back to main MF perimeter.

    NUMBER 2 - Initial heavy NVA attack on the Western portion of MF perimeter at approximately 0600 hours, 11 November 1966.

    NUMBER 3 - NVA attempt a heavy probe on the Eastern portion of new perimeter causing the MF to retreat further to the southern portion of the Dry Lake Bed on 11 November 1966.

    NUMBER 4 - Location of the initial MF perimeter established by ?_oJake?__ Jacobelly late on the afternoon of 10 November 1966, approximately 200-300 yards south of the MF platoon ambush position at NUMBER 1 .

    NUMBER 5 - Shaded area represents the initial MF position upon their arrival on the early afternoon of 10 November 1966. Clyde Sincere departed this same location at approximately 1430 hours, 10 November 1966 to return to Pleiku with two NVA POW?_Ts by chopper. This is the same general area that Clyde returned to on the morning of 11 November. The UH1D chopper was heavily damaged as a result of NVA 12.7mm AA fire resulting in the KIA of Paul Hess and Hank Leonard. This is also the same area that ?_oJake?__ sustained serious wounds and had to be dragged to the rear and safety by Bob Ramsey and Danny Panfil.






    Dad getting 0-5...

    Scanned%252520Document.jpg
  • wpagewpage Member Posts: 10,191 ✭✭✭
    edited November -1
    My dad brought back a NCO * sword and Arisaka bayonet from the Aluetion islands the barrels of T99 and 38 rifles which he was ordered to burn @ the island of Attu. Most of the * had committed Hari Kari and left all thier gear obviously for the taking.
    He said there was a mountainous funeral pyre of guns wasted on that God forsaken frozen Island off Alaska's archipelago.
  • RadarRadar Member Posts: 2,504 ✭✭✭✭✭
    edited November -1
    My friends brought home maybe a couple of French weapons,one was a WWII German Mauser probley captured from the Germans in WWI,the other was a 1903 Springfield that was one of about 30 found in a catch. They were in better shape that most of the weapons that were being used and taken care of.( well ya know )
  • 1935Lee1935Lee Member Posts: 61 ✭✭
    edited November -1
    July 66 I packed out a pair of french 9mm machine pistols, sold them in Saigon the day before going to Sydney on a 7 day R&R
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